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I. INTRODUCTION
Access to medical care is an issue of acute and increasing impor-
tance in the United States, a country in which the most promising of
ground-breaking technologies may be available to only the privileged
few. Although debate about the problem of unequal access to medical
care typically centers on financial obstacles to advanced therapies and
the obvious inequity of allowing patients' ability to pay to drive treat-
ment decisions, issues of equitable access for patients of both genders
and all racial and ethnic backgrounds increasingly have come into
focus.
These concerns about equitable access animate the ongoing debate
about how government should regulate the transplantation of kidneys.
More than 100,000 people in the United States suffer from kidney fail-
ure-what doctors call "end-stage renal disease" (ESRD).1 While kid-
ney failure may be treated with dialysis,' kidney transplantation is the
preferred treatment: studies show that transplant recipients are more
likely to return to work, avoid hospitalization, and enjoy a greater sense
1. U.S. Renal Data System (USRDS), 1990 Annual Data Report.
2. Dialysis mechanically purifies a patient's blood. The patient must remain attached to a
dialysis machine three times a week for treatments that might take three to four hours each.
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of well-being than patients on dialysis.3 Kidney transplants constitute
more than three-fourths of the solid organ transplants performed in
this country and have success rates routinely as high as eighty percent.4
A severe shortage of transplantable kidneys, however, limits the availa-
bility of this preferred treatment.' For example, in 1990, while more
than 18,000 Americans were registered on waiting lists, fewer than 8200
received renal transplants.6
Federal regulations control the allocation of scarce donated kidneys
among prospective recipients. Since 1972, Medicare has covered the
costs of virtually all kidney transplants.7 To qualify for Medicare reim-
bursement, transplanting hospitals must abide by rules promulgated by
the federal Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
(OPTN).8 Current OPTN policies for cadaveric kidney allocation give
strong preference to potential recipients who are genetically similar to
3. See Roger W. Evans, et al., The Quality of Life of Patients With End-Stage Renal Dis-
ease, 312 New Eng. J. Med. 553 (1985); R. J. Fischel, et al., Long-term Outlook for Renal Trans-
plant Recipients with One-year Function, 51 Transplantation 118 (1991); Roger W. Evans, The
Demand for Transplantation in the United States, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Clinical Transplants
1990 319 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1991).
4. Paul W. Eggers, Effect of Transplantation on the Medicare End-Stage Renal Disease
Program, 318 New Eng. J. Med. 223 (1988); James F. Blumstein, Federal Organ Transplantation
Policy: A Time for Reassessment?, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 451, 460 (1989).
5. Transplantable kidneys come from either "living related" or "cadaveric" donors. In 1990,
1714 transplants were performed using kidneys from living related donors and 6443 from cadaveric
donors. Potentially many more cadaveric kidneys could be harvested. Up to 20,000 Americans die
annually in circumstances-such as car accidents-that would make their organs suitable for
transplantation. Organ Transplants, H.R. Rep. No. 769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984); U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Report of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation: Issues
and Recommendations (1986); Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for
Human Organs, 14 J. Health, Pol., Pol'y & L. 57 (1989); Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of
Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
6. UNOS Update (March 1991); USRDS 1990 Report (cited in note 1); S. Takemoto, E. Car-
nahan and P. I. Terasaki, A Report of 504 Six Antigen-Matched Transplants, 23 Transplantation
Proc. 1318 (1991). The selection process through which ESRD patients are placed on a waiting list
is left largely to the discretion of the local transplant team. Developments in the Law: Medical
Technology and the Law, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1519, 1630 (1990). A recent study has shown that
black dialysis patients have a significantly lower chance of being placed on a transplant waiting
list, even after controlling for a number of health factors that would affect the likelihood of trans-
plant success. J. Michael Soucie, John F. Neylan, and William McClellan, Race and Sex Differ-
ences in the Identification of Candidates for Renal Transplantation, 19 Am. J. Kidney Dis. 414
(1992). Compared to white males, the relative likelihoods that black males and females would be
placed on a waiting list were .78 and .67 respectively (both statistically significant at .05). The
process by which dialysis patients are selected for waiting lists is not the focus of this Article, yet it
also may be a key factor in the disparate access of black patients to kidney transplants. See 103
Harv. L. Rev. at 1632.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 426 (1988). For example, in 1988 Medicare paid for more than 92% of the
transplants performed. USRDS 1990 Report (cited in note 1). See also Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. at 454 (cited in note 4); Peter H. Shuck, Government Funding for Organ Transplants, 14 J.
Health, Pol., Pol'y & L. 169 (1989).
8. See Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 463-64.
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the donor as determined by the identification of antigens located on the
surface of cells.9 For example, if a harvested kidney has all the same
antigens as a potential recipient on the waiting list, then that patient
will receive the kidney-even if other dialysis patients have waited
longer for a transplant.10
The rationale for basing kidney allocation on "antigen matching" is
that a recipient who receives a kidney from a donor with similar anti-
gens may be less likely to have her immunologic system reject it. The
federal guidelines reflect a belief that better antigen matching will lead
to a higher rate of kidney graft survival and that this interest in maxi-
mizing transplant outcomes should outweigh the equitable claims of pa-
tients who must wait longer for a renal allograft.
Mandated antigen matching, however, also makes it difficult for
black dialysis patients to qualify for the pool of scarce cadaveric kid-
neys. Blacks wait almost twice as long as whites for their first trans-
plant-13.9 and 7.6 months respectively."' While whites comprise sixty-
one percent of the dialysis population, they receive seventy-four percent
of the kidney transplants.12 In a given year white dialysis patients have
approximately a seventy-eight percent higher chance of receiving a ca-
daveric transplant than black dialysis patients.' 3
The antigen matching rules are a "but for" cause of this racial dis-
parity. Because antigens are distributed differently among racial
groups,' 4 a white patient is more likely than a black patient to have
9. Antigens are proteins that stimulate an immune response. HLA antigens (human leuko-
cyte antigens) are found on the surface of nearly all human cells and are the product of genes
located in the Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC) of human DNA at chromosome six.
Michael Owen, Major Histocompatibility Complex, in Ivan M. Roitt, Jonathan Brostoff and David
K. Male, eds., Immunology 4.1 (Gower Medical, 2d ed. 1989). These antigens are the key determi-
nants that enable immunologically active cells to recognize "self" from "foreign" tissues, sparing
the former and destroying the latter. While the term "MHC antigens" may be more scientifically
correct, "HLA" remains in common usage within the transplant community. Efforts to improve
tissue compatibility by defining these antigens and allocating donated kidneys among recipients in
a manner that minimizes antigenic differences are known as "HLA matching." In this Article the
term "antigen matching" refers to this process.
10. These guidelines are discussed in greater detail in notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
11. Office of Inspector General, The Distribution of Organs for Transplantation: Expecta-
tions and Practices 8 (1991).
12. Health Care Financing Administration, End Stage Renal Disease Patient Profile Tables
(1988). In 1988, 33.5% of dialysis patients were black, but only 22.3% of cadaveric kidney trans-
plants went to black patients.
13. In 1988, 4865 cadaveric transplants were distributed among 67,778 white dialysis patients
(4865 / 67,778 = 7.17%), and 1486 cadaveric transplants were distributed among 36,951 black
dialysis patients (1486 / 36,951 = 4.02%). USRDS 1990 Report (cited in note 1). Thus, the likeli-
hood that a white dialysis patient will receive a kidney in a given year is 78% higher than the
likelihood that a black patient will receive a kidney ((7.17-4.02)/4.02 = 78.4%). More detailed
estimates are discussed in note 67 and accompanying text.
14. See note 79 and accompanying text.
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antigens that match those on a kidney from a white donor. Whites do-
nate almost ninety percent of kidneys in the United States. Because the
proportion of blacks on the waiting list is significantly higher than the
proportion of kidneys donated by blacks, white patients are more likely
to have antigens that match those on donated kidneys. Thus, a dispro-
portionately black waiting list chases a disproportionately white donor
pool.
Alternative allocation rules could eliminate the racial disparity in
access to donated kidneys.15 A first-come-first-served rule, for example,
would give all patients equal access to the pool of cadaveric kidneys.
Several scholars have argued that the best solution to racial disparity in
transplantation is to increase black donation of both cadaveric and liv-
ing related kidneys."6 They point out that blacks are less likely than
whites to donate both cadaveric and living related kidneys. 7 From this
they suggest that increasing black donation rates could improve the.
pool of well-matched kidneys for blacks on the waiting list and thus
mitigate the disparate effects of antigen matching rules.' 8
15. To be sure, other factors-including unequal access to waiting lists and a relative inabil-
ity of blacks to respond when an organ becomes available-contribute to this racial disparity. Fred
P. Sanfilippo, et al., Factors Affecting the Waiting Time of Cadaveric Kidney Transplant Candi-
dates in the United States, 267 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 247 (1992).
16. C. 0. Callender, Organ Donation in the Black Population: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 19 Transplantation Proc. 36 (Supp. 2 1987); Luis M. Perez, et al., Organ Donation in Three
Major American Cities with Large Latino and Black Populations, 46 Transplantation 553 (1988).
17. In 1988 blacks donated only 12% of living related transplants and only 8% of cadaveric
kidneys. Office of Inspector General, Distribution of Organs for Transplantation at 11 (cited in
note 11). Studies from New York, Los Angeles, Miami, and Washington D.C. document that blacks
were markedly underrepresented in donor statistics. Callender, 19 Transplantation Proc. 36 (cited
in note 16); Perez, et al., 46 Transplantation at 553 (cited in note 16) (saying that black families
were two to three times less likely to consent to organ donation than white families).
While the reasons for the lower rate of black organ donation are not fully understood, several
recent studies have addressed the problem. One found that the most common reasons for donor
reluctance were lack of information, religion, distrust of medical professionals, fear of premature
death, and a preference to donate only to members of the same race. Clive 0. Callender, et al.,
Attitudes Among Blacks Toward Donating Kidneys for Transplantation: A Pilot Project, 74 Nat'l
Med. Ass'n J. 807 (1982); Gallup Organization, Attitudes and Opinions of the American Public
Towards Kidney Donations (1983), cited in Callender, 19 Transplantation Proc. at 36.
The lower rate of consent by black families to cadaveric donation may be caused by the failure
of health care professionals to ask for consent in an effective way. The requests for consent come
disproportionately from whites. Current studies are investigating whether higher levels of consent
can be obtained if the persons making the request are of the same race as the potential donor
family. See The Partnership for Organ Donation and The Annenberg Washington Program, Solv-
ing the Donor Shortage By Meeting Family Needs: A Communications Model (Oct. 30-31, 1990).
18. The relatively low black donation rate does not justify the unequal access that results
from the present system. An individual white patient does not have a greater equitable claim to a
given cadaveric kidney than a black patient simply because blacks as a class donate fewer cadav-
eric kidneys than whites, especially given that the lower rates may be an artifact of disparate
procurement procedures. See note 17 (discussing the possibility that black families may encounter
substandard requests from medical professionals). Nonetheless, a class-based linking of an alloca-
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Intensified efforts to increase the donation rates of black Ameri-
cans, however, have virtually no chance of eliminating the disparate
rates of transplantation for blacks and whites. Because the waiting list
for kidney transplants is so disproportionately black, increasing the rate
of black donation cannot plausibly equalize the proportions of blacks
seeking and receiving kidneys. The incidence of ESRD in the United
States is nearly four times greater for blacks than whites: while blacks
comprise nearly twelve percent of the general population, thirty-four
percent of ESRD patients are black.1 9 To eliminate the disparate im-
pact of antigen matching, blacks would need to donate enough addi-
tional kidneys so that the proportion of black donors would
approximate the proportion of blacks on the waiting list-thirty-four
percent.2 0  To accomplish such an increase, the donation rate for
blacks-for both cadaveric and living related organs-would have to in-
crease to five times its current rate and more than four times the cur-
rent rate for whites. Increases of this magnitude are unlikely.21 Efforts
tion scheme to procurement might induce higher donation rates. The possible dependence of pro-
curement success on the system of allocation is discussed more fully in the text accompanying note
194. While we favor measures to increase the donation of cadaveric kidneys by blacks, increased
donation is unlikely to abrogate unequal racial access to transplantation.
19. USRDS 1990 Report (cited in note 1). The incidence rate of ESRD in the United States
is 376 per million for blacks and 99 per million for whites. Dan Gordon, Racial Differences in
ESRD, 19 Dialysis & Transplantation 114 (1990).
This disproportionate representation defies easy analysis and may be due to several factors.
Socioeconomic issues such as diet, accessibility of health care, education, and substance abuse
surely contribute. A. 0. Hosten, Kidney Disease in Blacks in North America-An Overview, 19
Transplantation Proc. at 5 (Supp. 2 1987). However, the key element in black ESRD appears to be
high blood pressure, or hypertension.
High blood pressure is more common in blacks for poorly defined reasons. Richard F. Gillum,
Pathophysiology of Hypertension in Blacks and Whites, 1 Hypertension 468 (1979). Blacks have
an incidence of hypertension-related ESRD 6.5 times that of whites. In several large series, hyper-
tensive kidney disease is the most common cause of ESRD in blacks. See, for example, Hosten, 19
Transplantation Proc. 5; Rafael Oriol, Jacques Le Pendu, and Calvin Chun, Influence of the Origi-
nal Disease, Race, and Center on the Outcome of Kidney Transplantation, 33 Transplantation 22
(1982). Thus, hypertension in the black population seems either to cause or exacerbate renal dis-
ease of all etiologies, hastening the progression to ESRD.
20. It is possible that even a proportionate representation of donated black kidneys would
not equalize the rates of antigen matching. Because blacks have more heterogeneous distributions
of antigen types, it may be less likely that a black patient will match the antigens on a donated
black kidney than that a white patient will match the antigens on a donated white kidney.
21. Current efforts to spur black donations, including educational funding and the use of
blacks to solicit cadaveric donations, have not generated increases of the magnitude required to
eliminate the disparity. Paul Delaney, Fighting Myths in a Bid to Get Blacks to Consider Trans-
plants, N.Y. Times C17 (Nov. 6, 1991). Substantial increases in the supply of kidneys might be
achieved by governmental purchase of the right to transplant cadaveric organs. Compare Cohen,
58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 5); Hansmann, 14 J. Health, Pol., Pol'y & L. at 57 (cited in
note 5); Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 Hastings Center Report 28 (Oct. 1986); Chris
Hedges, Egypt's Desperate Trade: Body Parts for Sale, N.Y. Times Al (Sept. 23, 1991). While a
market-oriented approach deserves careful consideration, we predict that our government is un-
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to increase black donation are laudable and important, but it is mis-
leading to argue that increasing black donation rates could significantly
reduce disparate racial access to transplantation.2
This Article explores whether the disparate racial impact of man-
dated antigen matching is justified by higher overall survival rates of
kidney transplants.23 Recent advances in the use of drugs that effec-
tively suppress immune responses have dramatically altered the impact
of antigen matching-the likelihood of graft survival may now be rela-
tively independent of the degree of antigen matching. Our tentative
conclusion is that technological advances have made antigen-based allo-
cation less critical to transplant success.
Normatively, we argue that the equitable claims of black dialysis
patients for cadaveric kidneys outweigh the marginal improvement in
transplant outcomes currently associated with matching. Guido Cala-
bresi and Philip Bobbitt have reasoned:
[C]orrected egalitarianism.., plays an unusually influential role in the American
concept of equality. It accepts the general premise of formal egalitarianism that
discrimination is proper so long as likes are treated alike, but corrects the operation
of this premise by rejecting it whenever methods applying it happen to produce
results which correlate the permissible category of discrimination-health, for ex-
ample-with an impermissible one, such as wealth or race.2
The federally mandated system for allocating kidneys has produced just
this impermissible effect based on an increasingly weak correlation with
health or transplant survival. Recent proposals to expand the influence
of antigen matching on organ allocation would further increase racial
disparity in transplantation.25 While the disparate racial impact of anti-
likely to adopt such an approach in the near future. Given the types of public and private initia-
tives that might plausibly be undertaken, the proportion of blacks on waiting lists almost certainly
will continue to be higher than the proportion of cadaveric kidneys donated by blacks.
22. For example, a recent article implicitly ascribes the racial disparity in transplantation
solely to rates of donation saying that "the lack of organs donated by blacks makes transplants to
blacks more difficult." Delaney, N.Y. Times at C17 (cited in note 21).
23. At the outset, it is important to note that for most potential recipients allocation of kid-
neys for transplantation is not a matter of life or death due to the alternative treatment offered by
dialysis. However, as noted previously, most authorities consider transplantation to be an optimal
therapy. See Eggers, 318 New Eng. J. Med. at 223 (cited in note 4); USRDS 1990 Report (cited in
note 1). Inexplicably, blacks have lower mortality rates on dialysis than whites. In 1986, for exam-
ple, blacks on dialysis had a 23% lower mortality rate than whites. Gordon, 19 Dialysis & Trans-
plantation at 114 (cited in note 19). Thus, one might justify the disparate racial impact of antigen
matching as a way of decreasing ESRD mortality by taking disproportionate numbers of whites off
dialysis, which is relatively more risky for them.
24. Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 25 (Norton, 1978).
25. See David W. Gjertson,'et al., National Allocation of Cadaveric Kidneys by HLA Match-
ing, 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (1991) (proposing to create a single national waiting list and to
allocate every kidney procured within the United States to the potential recipient with best anti-
gen match). See also Steve Takemoto, et al., Survival of Nationally Shared, HLA-Matched Kid-
ney Transplants from Cadaveric Donors, 327 New Eng. J. Med. 834 (1992).
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gen matching has been intensely analyzed within the transplant com-
munity in the last two years,26 it has been largely ignored in the legal
literature.17
The Article also serves as a case study of the difficulty of adminis-
tering regulations in the face of conflicting and evolving empirical data.
The increased demand for donor organs has intensified debate over al-
location, but the issues are not new. While some within the transplant
community argue that allocation based on antigen matching is the most
scientifically sound method, others contend that factors such as newer
drug therapies, evolving technology, and equitable access are of greater
importance.28 In the absence of firm empirical results, one of the most
important normative choices will be allocating burdens of
proof-because without certain knowledge about the benefits of antigen
matching or new drug therapies, much will turn on presumptions.
The time is now ripe to consider these issues. While the allocation
system was originally developed without the procedural protections of
the Administrative Procedure Act, the Department of Health and
Human Service (HHS) has decided to develop and submit for comment
a notice of proposed rulemaking to replace the mandatory allocation
system devised by UNOS. 29 HHS expects to publish proposed alloca-
tion rules in the Federal Register in the near future.30 This procedural
change may give those concerned with inequitable racial allocation an
opportunity to overcome regulatory inertia.
Part II of this Article provides the factual background. There, we
describe in more detail the federal rules governing antigen matching
and the reasons why these rules cause disparate racial access to cadav-
26. See, for example, S. M. Greenstein, et al., Does Kidney Distribution Based Upon HLA
Matching Discriminate Against Blacks?, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3874 (1989); Bertram L.
Kasiske, et al., The Effect of Race on Access and Outcome in Transplantation, 324 New Eng. J.
Med. 302 (1991); V. A. Lazda and M. E. Blaesing, Is Allocation of Kidneys on Basis of HLA
Match Equitable in Multiracial Populations?, 21 Transplantation Proc. 1415 (1989). The dispa-
rate access to cadaveric kidneys by blacks has also been a central concern of public officials. See
Office of Inspector General, Distribution of Organs for Transplantation (cited in note 1); Remarks
of Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services at the Partnership for Organ Dona-
tion's Consensus Conference (1991).
27. For example, a 1989 issue of a prominent health law journal that was devoted entirely to
organ transplantation failed to even refer to this concern. See James F. Blumstein and Frank A.
Sloan, eds., 14 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 1 (1989).
28. Both groups can produce scientific evidence supportive of their respective positions.
* Compare L. G. Hunsicker and Philip J. Held, The Role of HLA Matching for Cadaveric Renal
Transplants in the Cyclosporine Era, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (1992) with Gjertson, et al.,
324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (cited in note 25).
29. Letter of James 0. Mason, Asst. Secretary for Health, to Robert J. Corry, President of
UNOS (Sept. 22, 1989) [hereinafter "Mason Letter"].
30. Conversation with Reny Aronoss, HRSA project officer who oversees contract with UNOS
(Sept. 4, 1992) [hereinafter "Aronoss Conversation"].
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eric kidney transplants. We also explore the degree to which antigen
matching improves the likelihood of successful transplanta-
tion-focusing on newer immunological therapies that increasingly may
divorce graft survival from antigenic similarity.
Part III explores difficult normative issues of kidney allocation. In
our effort to justify a system that devalues antigen matching, we con-
sider the ethical choices that must be made-implicitly or explicitly-in
choosing one system of allocation over another. In particular, we pose in
concrete terms the tradeoff between enhanced graft survival and equi-
table allocation of available kidneys. We propose specific allocation
rules that seek to strike a more appropriate ethical and clinical balance.
Finally, Part IV examines the potential viability of a suit challeng-
ing the current regulations on a disparate impact theory. It should be
emphasized that here, as in other contexts,31 the presence of disparate
racial outcomes should not be taken to imply racial animus or bigotry
on the part of any of the relevant advocates or decisionmakers. To the
contrary, it is our firm belief that there is a surfeit of good faith among
the various actors in the transplant community. The differences of
opinion are inevitable and, indeed, a healthy byproduct of thoughtful
responses to these complex and important issues.
II. ANTIGEN MATCHING
A. The UNOS Policies for Mandated Sharing of Well-Matched
Kidneys
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA)32 provided
funds for HHS to establish the Organ Procurement and Transplanta-
tion Network (OPTN) 3 The OPTN was to be a nonprofit organization
devoted to establishing (i) a national list of people who need organs, 4
(ii) a national system to match organs and individuals on the list, 5 and
(iii) criteria for allocating organs. 6 In 1986 HHS awarded the OPTN
contract to a pre-existing entity, the United Network for Organ Sharing
31. See, for example, Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 817 (1991).
32. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273, 274(a)-(e) (1988
and Supp. II 1990).
33. Id. at § 274. An excellent summary of federal regulation of organ transplantation is pro-
vided by Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 461-76 (cited in note 4).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 274(b) (1988).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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(UNOS), which had already established a central computer registry of
potential kidney recipients.3
The 1984 act also provided grants for qualified Organ Procurement
Organizations (OPOs). sa NOTA required OPOs to have effective agree-
ments "with a substantial majority" of the transplanting hospitals
within a service area to acquire and allocate all usable organs "equita-
bly among transplant patients according to established medical crite-
ria."' 9 To qualify for grants, OPOs also had to be members of the
OPTN, but OPTN membership was not a legal prerequisite for either
procuring or transplanting kidneys. As Professor James Blumstein
summarized:
To the extent that the Network was useful and provided a service, transplant cen-
ters and their patients could benefit from the system of coordination. To the extent
that other avenues of donation and procurement were available and more attrac-
tive, transplant centers and their patients were free to utilize those other sources
and resources as well.40
The voluntary participation in the OPTN changed, however, in 1986
with the passage of the Sixth Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(SOBRA) 41 and its addition of Section 1138 to the Social Security Act.42
Section 1138 requires that to qualify for Medicare or Medicaid reim-
bursements, hospitals with transplant programs must be members of
the OPTN (i.e., UNOS) and abide by its rules. Compliance with the
policies of UNOS is a prerequisite not only for Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement relating to transplantation, but for all Medicare and
Medicaid payments. Section 1138 thus effectively mandates compliance
with UNOS's policies43 because noncompliance means that the hospital
37. See Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 463 (cited in note 4); Frank A. Sloan, May W.
Shayne and Marilyn D. Doyle, Is There a Rationale for Regionalizing Organ Transplantation
Services?, 14 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 115, 127 (1989). As an overview for understanding HHS's
supervision of UNOS, it is useful to introduce the relevant administrative actors that directly or
indirectly control transplantation policy. The Division of Organ Transplantation is part of the
Bureau of Health Resources Department which is part of the Health Resources and Services Ad-
ministration (HRSA, pronounced her'-sa) which is part of HHS. In addition, the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (HCFA, pronounced hick'-fa) is responsible for the administration of
Medicare and Medicaid coverage for kidney transplants. HCFA is also a part of HHS.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1),(2) (1988).
39. Id. at § 273(b)(3).
40. Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 464 (cited in note 4).
41. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (1986).
42. Id. § 9318(a), 100 Stat. at 2009-10. Section 1138 of the Social Security Act is codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8 (1988 and Supp. II 1990). See Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 467 (cited
in note 4).
43. UNOS Policy 1.0 establishes: "By acceptance of membership in UNOS, each member
agrees to be bound by all provisions of the UNOS Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws and Poli-
cies." UNOS Policy 1.0 (1991).
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must "forgo Medicare and Medicaid payment for all services, not just
transplant services.
' 44
1. An Introduction to Antigen Compatibility
Current UNOS policies explicitly mandate allocation of cadaveric
kidneys to potential recipients with antigens similar to those of the do-
nor. Before examining the specifics of these policies, it is useful to pro-
vide a brief introduction to antigen matching. An antigen is a protein
on the surface of tissues that can stimulate an immune response. HLA
antigens enable white blood cells-the primary immunologically-active
cells of the body-to distinguish between "self" and "foreign" tissue.45
Unless suppressed by drug therapy, the immune system will attack tis-
sue that it recognizes as foreign, but ignore "self" tissue. If kidney tis-
sue bearing specific antigens is transplanted into a person whose tissue
does not bear those antigens, then the immune system of the recipient
will attack the transplanted tissue in a process known as rejection. As
will be stressed below, 46 however, the immune system can be suppressed
by drugs, enabling transplanted kidneys to survive, even in the presence
of foreign antigens.
Antigens are the expression, or phenotype, of Major Histocompa-
tibility Complex (MHC) genes. Current techniques cannot detect MHC
differences at the genomic level in humans; however, phenotypic differ-
ences-differing antigens on the surface of cells-are readily detected
by a process known as tissue typing.47 Sets of antigens at three loca-
44. 53 Fed. Reg. 6525, 6529-30 (1988) (emphasis in original) (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 42 C.F.R.). Section 1138 gave the OPTN contracting party (UNOS) potentially coercive
power that was criticized because it was unchecked by traditional due process protections. See, for
example, Mason Letter (cited in note 29); Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 496 (cited in note
4). The Organ Transplant Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3114, responds
in part to these concerns by mandating publication of its policies and providing "members of the
public an opportunity to comment." Id. at 3115. HHS has determined that the UNOS policies
must be submitted to the HHS Secretary for approval and must follow Administrative Procedure
Act guidelines for proposed rulemaking and ultimate publication in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Organ Procure-
ment and Transplantation Network Rules and Actions, 54 Fed. Reg. 51802, 51803 (1989).
45. The principal white blood cells involved in immune response are called lymphocytes. In
the human body there are approximately 1012 (one trillion) lymphocytes, each of which recognizes
a single antigen from among the universe of all possible antigens. As the immune system develops,
those lymphocytes that recognize and destroy "self' tissues are deleted. When, however, trans-
planted tissues with foreign antigens are recognized by lymphocytes, the process of immunologic
destruction, or "rejection," is initiated. Rejection is the bane of transplantation: if untreated, it
results in the loss of the transplanted organ. Ken Welsh and David Male, Transplantation and
Rejection, in Ivan M. Roitt, Jonathan Brostoff, and David K. Male, eds., Immunology 24.1 (Gower
Medical, 2d ed. 1989).
46. See Part II.C.4.
47. The basic tissue typing technique involves placing the tissue cells to be typed into nu-
merous "wells," each with a different type of serum known to contain antibodies to a specific
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tions, or loci, on the cell surface have been found to be particularly rele-
vant in transplantation. These three antigen loci are denoted A, B, and
DR, and different specificities are commonly labelled by number. For
example, at the A locus common antigens include Al, All, and A25.
Each person has two antigens at each locus"--one inherited from each
parent-totalling six antigens altogether. In the absence of immunosup-
pressive drugs, these antigens strongly affect whether a recipient's im-
mune system will attack a transplanted kidney.49
Only identical twins possess identical MHC genes and HLA anti-
gens at all loci; their tissues are thus immunologically interchangeable.
Indeed, the earliest successful kidney transplants were between twins.
As antigens were identified in the early and mid 1960s, doctors hoped
that by matching antigens between donor and recipient as closely as
possible the results achievable in twins could be approximated with
minimal immunosuppression. In transplants from living relatives of the
recipient this has proven true because genetic inheritance of all anti-
gens makes phenotypic status (antigen matching) a good proxy for the
underlying genotypic status. -However, with transplantation of cadaveric
organs, which are obtained from persons of diverse genetic back-
grounds, the use of antigen matching is a poorer proxy for the underly-
ing MHC genes that more directly control the immune response. In
order to successfully transplant organs between any nontwin donor-re-
cipient pairs, immune responses must be suppressed in some way, usu-
ally by drugs. Thus, while antigen matching has from its inception
accurately predicted outcomes in living-related transplantation, its role
when cadaveric donors are used has been controversial.
antigen (e.g., A2). If the antibodies of a particular serum result in the death of the tissue cells that
are to be typed, one can infer that the cells must have that particular antigen expressed on their
surface. Michael Steward and David Male, Immunological Techniques, in Ivan M. Roitt, Jonathan
Brostoff and David K. Male, eds., Immunology 25.1 (Gower Medical, 2d ed. 1989).
48. An A locus might, for example, have both the Al and All antigens.
49. In some patients tissue typing is unable to identify six different antigens. For example,
tissue typing might identify only the Al antigen at the A locus. Current techniques would thus
define a total of five (1A, 2B, and 2DR) rather than six antigens in such a person, who would be
said to have a "blank" at the A locus. Blanks may represent either as yet unidentified antigen
specificities or "homozygosity." A person would be homozygous on the A locus if both A antigens
were, for instance, All. Such a kidney would be "phenotypically" matched to be transplanted into
a recipient who had the donor's five antigens and any additional antigen at the donor's homozy-
gotic locus. Again, as long as the donor kidney does not have antigens present that are absent in
the recipient, the recipient's immune response may be weaker.
Blanks in blacks may be more likely to represent as yet unidentified antigens than homozygos-
ity. See note 47 (discussing tissue typing with serum). It is well documented that HLA antigen
expression is less well-defined in blacks than whites. A. H. Johnson, S. Rosen-Bronson and C. K.
Hurley, Heterogeneity of the HLA-D Region in American Blacks, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3872
(1989).
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Another type of antigen matching relevant to transplantation con-
cerns blood group (ABO) compatibility. Antigens that distinguish blood
types A, B, and 0 are also present on the surface of kidney tissue. 0
Blood types A and B, for example, refer to blood cells that have either
A or B antigens, respectively. Just as type A blood cannot be transfused
into a patient with type B blood, neither will a type B recipient accept
a kidney from a type A donor. Donor and recipient must have compati-
ble blood type antigens-regardless of the type of immunosuppressant
drug therapy. Blood type 0, however, refers to the absence of either the
A or B antigens. Hence, type 0 kidneys can be transplanted into either
type A or type B recipients. Persons who are type 0 are said to be
"universal" donors, but can receive kidneys (or blood) only from others
of the same blood type. Conversely, a small fraction of persons possess
both the A and B antigens-blood type AB-and are universal
recipients. 51
2. Mandatory National Sharing of Six-Antigen-Matched Kidneys
The current UNOS policies privilege antigen matching in two sepa-
rate ways. First, the policies mandate that all "six antigen matched"
kidneys be shared on a national basis.52 The policy is implemented in
the following manner. When an ESRD patient is placed into the UNOS
computer registry, his or her blood type and HLA antigens are also re-
corded. As a cadaveric kidney becomes available, blood and tissue typ-
ing are immediately performed on the donor, and the results are
entered into the computer registry. If a donated kidney is a six-antigen
match with an ABO compatible dialysis patient on the UNOS waiting
list, then "it is mandatory that the kidney shall be offered for the six
antigen match patient."53
The six-antigen match is, however, a term of art that includes a
growing number of harvested kidneys. 4 If tissue typing identifies only
one antigen on each of the three loci of the donor-that is, three blanks
50. The Rh+ or Rh- blood-type antigen that distinguishes, for example, blood type O-posi-
tive from 0-negative is not present in kidney tissue and is not relevant to transplantation.
51. David Male, Reactions Against Blood Cells and Platelets, in Ivan M. Roitt, Jonathan
Brostoff and David K. Male, eds., Immunology 20.4 (Gower Medical, 2d ed. 1989).
52. The UNOS policies on their face govern the allocation of kidneys from living related
donors as well as from cadavers. This means that a kidney donated by the sibling of a dialysis
patient could potentially qualify as a six-antigen match with nonrelated recipients. The guidelines
mandate that this kidney be offered first to the unrelated six-antigen match. See Blumstein, 22
U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 486-88 (cited in note 4). In practice, however, kidneys from family members
are considered to be "donated" for a specific recipient and are not subject to allocation guidelines.
53. UNOS Policy 3.3.3 (1992). If there is more than one six-antigen-matched patient, the
kidney shall be offered to the patient with the highest number of UNOS points. Id. The UNOS
point system is discussed in note 61 and accompanying text.
54. UNOS defines a "six antigen match" to be
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are present 5 5-a donated kidney may still qualify as a six-antigen
match. 6 This effective redefinition of a six-antigen match to mean a
"zero antigen mismatch" has important implications for the number of
transplants governed by UNOS's mandatory sharing policy. HLA anti-
gens are distributed so that fewer than ten percent of cadaveric dona-
tions go to true six-antigen-matched recipients.5 7 This number may be
as high as twenty-five percent, however, if a zero antigen mismatch
standard is used instead. 8
3. The Mandatory Local Point System
If a cadaveric kidney does not qualify as a six-antigen match for
national sharing, then UNOS policies mandate that the cadaveric kid-
neys be allocated locally5 9 according to the point system set out in Ta-
ble 1.60
a match between a donor and recipient where the recipient is ABO compatible and matched
on all 6 HLA-A, B, and DR antigens with the donor or there is phenotypic identity between
the donor and recipient where at least one antigen is identified at the A, B, loci and DR loci.
UNOS Policy 3.3.1 (1992).
55. The identification of a single antigen on an individual locus can signify two very different
things. First, as discussed in note 49, the presence of a blank might mean that the locus is homozy-
gotic in that both antigens on that locus are the same. Conversely, a blank could signify the pres-
ence of an as yet undefined antigen specificity. Current tests cannot distinguish between the two.
The rationale for this aspect of the guidelines is that as tissue typing has become more reliable,
blanks are more likely to define homozygosity, which would pose less of a barrier to successful
transplantation than unidentified antigens.
There are, however, a large number of antigens that still cannot be typed by laboratory serum.
In a recent national study, laboratories were unable to identify antigens on the DR locus for more
than 30% of the white population and for more than 40% of the black population. E. L. Milford,
L. Ratner, and E. Yunis, Will Transplant Immunogenetics Lead to Better Graft Survival in
Blacks?-Racial Variability in the Accuracy of Tissue Typing for Organ Donation: The Fourth
American Workshop, 19 Transplantation Proc. 30, 31 (Supp. 2 1987).
56. On January 21, 1991 UNOS extended this definition further to cover blanks discovered
on the DR locus as well so that kidneys with only three identified antigens may qualify for six-
antigen-matched treatment. UNOS Policy Proposal Statement (Jan. 21, 1991).
57. M. Ray Mickey, Daniel J. Cook, and Paul I. Terasaki, Recipient Pool Sizes for Priori-
tized HLA Matching, 47 Transplantation 401 (1989).
58. Id. See also Paul I. Terasaki, Steve Takemoto and M. Ray Mickey, A Report on 123 Six-
Antigen Matched Cadaver Kidney Transplants, 3 Clinical Transplantation 301 (1989); note 25
and accompanying text.
59. The cadaveric kidney shall be allocated among the list of local recipients defined to be
"either the individual transplant center recipient list or a shared list of recipients within a defined
procurement area and shall be no larger than the OPO." UNOS Policy 3.5.1 (1992).
60. UNOS Policy 3.5 (1992). Prior to 1987 each local transplant program could set its own
allocation policy. In 1987 UNOS adopted the "Starzl" system, which awarded up to 10 points for
waiting time, 12 for quality of antigen match, 10 for presensitization (discussed in note 61), 10 for
"medical urgency," and 6 for logistical factors such as proximity to the hospital. Thomas E. Starzl,
et al., A Multifactorial System for Equitable Selection of Cadaver Kidney Recipients, 257 J. Am.
Med. Ass'n 3073 (1987). See generally J. Michael Dennis, A Review of Centralized Rule-Making in
American Transplantation, 6 Transplantation Rev. 130, 132 (1992) (recounting the history of the
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TABLE 1. UNOS POINT SYSTEM FOR SELECTING KIDNEY TRANSPLANT
RECIPIENTS
Points
HLA matching
0 - A, B, DR mismatch 10
0 - B, DR mismatch 7
0 - A, B mismatch 6
1 - B, DR mismatch 3
2 - B, DR mismatch 2
3 - B, DR mismatch 1
Waiting Time
Patient with longest waiting period 1
(proportionate points for shorter periods)
Each year on waiting list .5
Children
Age 0-5 2
Age 6-10 1
Presensitization 61  4
The point system places heavy weight on the quality of the antigen
match, making ten out of approximately seventeen possible points con-
tingent on the number of antigens matched. In contrast, the system
gives only one point to the patient who has waited for the longest pe-
development of the point system). In 1989 the current point system, known as the "Terasaki modi-
fication," was adopted.
61. UNOS Policy 3.5.3 (1992). Four points are awarded if the recipient shows a high likeli-
hood of reacting immunologically to more than 80% of the potential donors, but displays a nega-
tive crossmatch with a particular donor. A positive crossmatch indicates that the recipient already
has produced antibodies against the donor's HLA antigens and thus precludes placing a kidney
from that donor into that recipient. All persons on a waiting list have their blood tested periodi-
cally (usually monthly) for antibodies against HLA antigens in a laboratory test. This is done using
a "panel" of cells from approximately 40 random donors. If a person's blood reacts with 10 of 40
donors, he or she is said to have 25% panel reactive antibodies (PRA), implying approximately a
25% chance of reacting positively with any single donor from the larger population of potential
donors. Thus, for patients with high ( 80%) PRA levels, it is difficult to find a donor with a
negative crossmatch.
The rationale for this rule is that because the recipient has demonstrated poor compatibility
with the larger population of potential donors, but has shown a preliminary compatibility with a
particular donor, he or she should receive the kidney. Put simply, extra points are awarded be-
cause a better match is not likely to come along. Transplantation to these recipients is privileged
in order to provide equitable access, not to maximize success rates. Indeed, patients with high PRA
levels may comprise a group at "high risk" for graft loss. Prasad Koka and J. M. Cecka, Sensitiza-
tion and Crossmatching in Renal Transplantation, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Clinical Transplants
1989 379 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1989).
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riod; those who have not waited as long get fractions of a point.6 2 The
point system also awards an additional one-half point for each addi-
tional year on the waiting list after one year. The net result is almost
complete emphasis on antigen matching in determining allocation, with
time on the waiting list serving largely as a tie-breaker. Thus, in vying
for a particular kidney, a patient with only one antigen matched could
conceivably be awarded a kidney over someone who had waited up to
two years longer.6 4
B. The Costs of Matching: Disparate Access to Cadaveric Kidneys
This Part argues that blacks have disproportionately limited access
to cadaveric kidneys and that the mandatory allocation system based
on antigen matching contributes to this racial disparity.6 The first task
is relatively straightforward. As discussed above,6 33.5% of dialysis pa-
tients in 1988 were black, but blacks received only 22.3% of cadaveric
kidney transplants. Detailed studies of national and regional data un-
derscore the fact that white dialysis patients may have more than a fifty
percent greater chance of receiving a transplant.6 7 A multivariate analy-
sis conducted by the Urban Institute indicates that even after control-
ling for a host of other socioeconomic variables, the likelihood of
cadaveric transplants for blacks relative to whites is only fifty-five per-
cent. 8 This disparity in access to cadaveric kidneys means blacks have
to wait almost twice as long as whites for their first transplant (13.9
months for blacks as compared to 7.6 months for whites).6 9
At least a portion of this disparity is attributable to matching ABO
blood groups, as required by UNOS policy. 0 ABO compatibility is re-
62. UNOS Policy 3.5.2 (1992).
63. Id.
64. For example, a patient with no A locus matches and one out of four B and DR matches
and who had just been placed on the waiting list would receive one point for the antigen match (3 -
B, DR mismatch). A patient with no antigen matches could wait almost two years and receive only
one point for his or her relative seniority on the waiting list (additional half points accrue only if
the additional year is completed).
65. This is not to say that other factors do not impede equal opportunities for blacks who
need transplants. A host of socioeconomic factors may also play a role. See notes 15 and 17.
66. See note 12.
67. See, for example, Carl. M. Kjellstrand, Age, Sex, and Race Inequality in Renal Trans-
plantation, 148 Arch. Intern. Med. 1305 (1988). In the United States in 1983, white patients had a
30% transplant rate and nonwhite patients had a 20% rate: "[N]onwhite patients aged 21 to 45
years had only half the chance of receiving a transplant compared with white patients of the same
age and sex." Id. at 1305.
68. Philip J. Held, et al., Access to Kidney Transplantation: Has the United States Elimi-
nated Income and Racial Differences?, 148 Arch. Intern. Med. 2594, 2596 (1988).
69. See note 11 and accompanying text.
70. See UNOS Policy 3.3.1 (1992). The antigenic basis of blood typing is discussed at notes
50-51 and accompanying text.
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quired for successful transplantation. As Table 2 demonstrates, the
medical requirement of ABO compatibility causes white dialysis pa-
tients to receive a disproportionate share of cadaveric kidneys because
these antigens are distributed differently in whites and blacks.7 1
TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF ABO BLOOD GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES
ABO Group White Black Av. Waiting List Time
0 45% 49% 14.3 mos.
A 40 27 6.9
B 11 20 15.7
AB 4 4 4.6.
In particular, the large pool of blood type A donations will go dispro-
portionately to white recipients."
The UNOS rules, however, go beyond the medical requirement of
ABO compatibility by mandating that blood type 0 kidneys, which are
universal donors, be transplanted only into patients with blood type
O. 7 This "0 rule" prohibits types A and B from competing for donated
O kidneys. The UNOS 0 rule was promulgated to provide equal access
for 0 recipients for whom only an 0 kidney is suitable and who in the
past were thought to have waited inordinately long for a transplant.7 4
On balance, however, the 0 rule reduces blacks's ability to qualify for
kidney transplants. Blacks are almost twice as likely as whites to have
blood type B (twenty percent versus eleven percent).75 Under the 0 rule
black dialysis patients who have blood type B must wait for a relatively
small supply of type B kidneys.76 If the rule were repealed, these pa-
tients could look to the much larger pool of 0 donors because forty-five
71. Frances K. Widmann, ed., Technical Manual of the American Association of Blood
Banks (American Ass'n of Blood Banks, 9th ed. 1985); Kasiske, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. 302
(cited in note 26).
72. "The fact that whites (40 percent of whom have blood group A) make up the majority of
organ donors suggests that cadaver kidneys will more often go to whites than to blacks (27 percent
of whom have blood group A)." Kasiske, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. at 302-03.
73. UNOS Policy 3.4 (1992). An exception to this rule is allowed for "six antigen matched
patients who have a blood group other than 0." Id. This exception to the 0 kidney rule is likely to
favor whites disproportionately. It is much more likely that white recipients with, for example,
blood type A, will meet the six-antigen qualification for a type 0 cadaveric kidney. As discussed in
detail at text accompanying notes 87-90, this results from the higher propensity of white donors to
have six antigen matches with white recipients.
74. F. K. Port, et al., Discrepancies in the Distribution of Renal Allografts Cause Prolonged
Waiting Times for Blood Type 0 Patients, 35 Kidney Int'l 522 (1989). See also F. K. Port, et al.,
The Impact of Nonidentical ABO Cadaveric Renal Transplantation on Waiting Times and Graft
Survival, 17 Am. J. Kidney Dis. 519 (1991).
75. See text accompanying note 71.
76. Again, this is because most cadaveric kidneys come from a white population that has only
11% type B kidneys.
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percent of white donors have blood type 0. Although the 0 rule helps
black recipients with blood type 0, an analysis of these competing ef-
fects using differential equations suggests that the blood type B effect
dominates."' The likely effect of the 0 rule is to increase the percentage
of blacks on the waiting list and the amount of time the average black
has to wait. 8
Of greater importance, however, are the UNOS policies that man-
date organ allocation based on HLA antigen matching. These regula-
tions restrict the availability of cadaveric kidneys for black patients for
the simple reason that most donors are white, and white kidneys tend
to have different antigens than black kidneys. The American Society of
Histocompatibility and Immunogenetics recently reported a study of
HLA antigen frequency. With the participation of eighty-three tissue-
typing laboratories, the study showed that twenty-two antigens on the
A, B, and DR loci have statistically significant differences in the fre-
quency of appearance in blacks and whites. These disparate frequencies
are shown in Table 3.
77. See Appendix. An analysis of differential equations suggests that blood type B patients
will need to wait much longer for kidneys than blood type A patients-even though under the 0
rule neither blood type A nor B patients can qualify for donated 0 kidneys. The reason that the 0
rule hurts blood type B patients more than blood type A patients is that the donated kidneys are
disproportionately white and therefore disproportionately blood type A relative to ESRD patients.
ESRD patients with blood type A accordingly have a relatively large pool of cadaveric kidneys
even without receiving 0 type transplants. Blood type B recipients, however, face a very small pool
of donated type B kidneys and, accordingly, are dramatically affected by the inability to qualify
for type 0 cadaveric transplants.
78. The average waiting list times reported above support this analysis. Under the 0 rule the
average waiting time for the predominantly black B recipients is higher than for 0 recipients (15.7
months > 14.3 months), while the average waiting time for the predominantly white A recipients
is lower than for 0 recipients (6.9 months < 14.3 months). The 0 rule reduces the waiting time for
type 0 recipients and increases the waiting times for blood type A and particularly for type B
recipients.
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TABLE 3. ANTIGEN FREQUENCY BY RACE
"A" Locus Antigens:
"B" Locus Antigens:
"DR" Locus Antigens:
Antigen White (%)
Disproportionately White
Al 23.4
All 11.8
A24 16.4
A25 6.8
Disproportionately Black
A23 5.6
A30 7.0
Aw33 4.6
Aw34 0.8
Aw36 0.2
Disproportionately White
B8 12.4
B13 5.1
B27 7.5
B38 6.9
B44 16.4
Bw60 7.8
Bw62 9.0
Disproportionately Black
Bw42 1.4
B45 2.0
Bw53 1.4
Bw58 1.6
Disproportionately White
DR4 20.0
Disproportionately Black
DR9 2.4
These differences in frequency of antigen expression are exacerbated by
what doctors call "linkage disequilibrium."80 The expression of certain
antigens on one locus is often positively correlated (or "linked") with
79. Milford, Ratner and Yunis, 19 Transplantation Proc. at 31 (cited in note 55)
80. Owen, Major Histocompatibility Complex, in Immunology 4.1-.11 (cited in note 9). See
also M.R. Mickey and Paul I. Terasaki, The Serological Data of the 8th WorkShop and Summary
Analyses, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Histocompatibility Testing 21 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Labora-
tory, 1980); G. Opelz and A. Engelman, Effect of HLA Matching in Cyclosporine-Treated Black
Kidney Transplant Recipients, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3881 (1989).
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Black (%)
9.8
3.7
6.1
0.9
22.3
22.0
16.2
13.1
9.1
14.6
8.8
17.4
11.9
4.9.79
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particular antigens at another locus. This linkage exacerbates these ra-
cial differences because a black recipient failing to match a white donor
on one locus may be less likely to match at other loci as well.
Not surprisingly, these disparate antigen pools cause blacks to have
fewer potential antigen matches with a predominantly white cadaveric
donor pool. A recent study in Illinois calculated how well 352 cadaveric
kidneys matched 604 patients on the local UNOS waiting list.81 The
study revealed that while only 52% of the overall waiting list was white,
whites dominated the class of recipients having four or more antigens
matching-with 71.8% of these well-matched kidneys.8 2 Since the ma-
jority of donors is white, such disparity in antigen distribution, coupled
with an allocation system based heavily on HLA matching, places po-
tential black recipients at a significant disadvantage. Several studies re-
veal that white patients receive the vast majority of kidney transplants
with excellent donor-recipient histocompatibility-more than four anti-
gen matches.8 3
Another recent study shows directly that UNOS's emphasis of anti-
gen matching reduces the number of blacks that qualify for transplan-
tation. Lazda analyzed an alternative point system approved by
UNOS-termed a "variance"-for the Regional Organ Bank of Illinois
(ROBI).s4 Operating under the UNOS variance, ROBI allocates cadav-
eric kidneys under a point system that emphasizes time on the waiting
list more strongly relative to the quality of the antigen match than does
the UNOS system.85 Larger numbers of black candidates received
transplants under the ROBI variance.8 6
81. Lazda and Blaesing, 21 Transplantation Proc. 1415 (cited in note 26).
82. Id. at 1415. Potential black recipients, who made up 39.9% of the overall waiting list,
comprised only 16.2% of the four or more antigen matches. These discrepancies are further exacer-
bated if the analysis is restricted to matching the cadaveric kidneys from white donors. In that
case white patients would receive 75.2% of the four or more antigen matches, and black patients
would receive only 14%. These latter figures may be more relevant on a nationwide level because
the Illinois study contained a relatively elevated proportion of cadaveric kidneys from black donors
(13.9%).
83. Id. See also Velta A. Lazda, The Impact of HLA Frequency Differences in Races on the
Access to Optimally HLA-Matched Cadaver Renal Transplants, 53 Transplantation 352 (1992);
Robert S. Gaston, et al., Improved Survival of Primary Cadaveric Renal Allografts in Blacks with
Quadruple Immunosuppression, 53 Transplantation 103 (1992).
84. V. A. Lazda, An Evaluation of a Local Variance of the United Network for Organ Shar-
ing (UNOS) Point System on the Distribution of Cadaver Kidneys to Waiting Minority Recipi-
ents, 23 Transplantation Proc. 901 (1991).
85. As summarized by J. Michael Dennis: "The main difference [between the UNOS and
ROBI point systems] is that ROBI gives no points to two of the less match grades (2 and 3 BDR
mismatches) and offers slightly more points for length of wait." J. Michael Dennis, American
Blacks, Kidney Transplantation & The Politics of Local Inequality (1991) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
86. Id.
[Vol. 46:805
UNEQUAL RACIAL ACCESS
The disparate racial impact is even more extreme with regard to
the mandatory sharing of six-antigen matches. The initial study of
mandatory sharing of six-antigen-matched kidneys revealed that of 123
transplants, blacks received only two.8 7 Subsequent studies have con-
firmed this virtual exclusion of blacks from the pool of six-antigen-
matched transplants at the national level, although when six-antigen
match is redefined as "zero-antigen mismatch" the proportion of kid-
neys going to blacks rises to seven percent. 8 A recent study from the
University of Alabama at Birmingham, where the waiting list is sixty-
five percent black, revealed that of thirty-three mandatorily shared kid-
neys only one was transplanted into a black recipient. 9 Hunsicker and
Held have estimated that mandatory national sharing of all kidneys
with no HLA mismatches would result in a maximum of eight percent
going to black recipients and would reduce the total number of kidneys
available to black patients by three percent.90
C. The Disappearing Benefits of Matching
Given the inherent disparate racial impact of the UNOS antigen
matching policies, the desirability of antigen matching turns crucially
on the degree to which matching enhances the probability of transplant
survival."' This section takes up this question and makes four stylized
conclusions:
(1) Independent of any effect of antigen matching, black kidney
recipients have lower survival rates than white recipients;
Against a waiting list with blacks making up 42 percent, the UNOS point system ranked
candidates so that 37 percent of the highest ranked potential recipients was black, the ROBI
system 41 percent. When the donor was a non-black, 33 and 39 percent of the highest ranked
recipients were black for the UNOS and ROBI protocols respectively.
Id.
Dennis notes, however, that it is difficult to assess the national effect of antigen matching on
black recipients because several OPOs have variances that deemphasize antigen matching.
87. Terasaki, Takemoto, and Mickey, 3 Clinical Transplantation at 303 (cited in note 58).
88. See Takemoto, et al., 327 New Eng. J. Med. 834 (cited in note 25). This percentage still is
lower than the proportion of cadaveric kidneys donated by blacks-approximately eight per-
cent-perhaps because the distribution of antigens among blacks is more heterogenous than
among whites.
89. Bruce Barger, et al., The Impact of the UNOS Mandatory Sharing Policy on Recipients
of the Black and White Races-Experience at a Single Renal Transplant Center, 53 Transplanta-
tion 770 (1992).
90. Hunsicker and Held, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28).
91. Antigen matching might also enhance patient survival. However, numerous studies have
found no statistically significant correlation between either race or antigen matching on the mor-
tality rate of transplant recipients. See, for example, Jane Galton, Racial Effect on Kidney Trans-
plantation, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Clinical Kidney Transplants 1985 153 (U.C.L.A. Tissue
Typing Laboratory, 1985); H. Krakauer, et al., The Recent U.S. Experience in the Treatment of
End-Stage Renal Disease By Dialysis and Transplantation, 308 New Eng. J. Med. 1558 (1983).
Our analysis of the benefits of antigen matching accordingly focuses on its effects on graft survival.
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(2) Six antigen matches may improve transplant survival signifi-
cantly-by approximately ten percent;
(3) Matching fewer than six antigens has a much less pronounced
effect on allograft survival for white recipients and no reliable effect on
survival rates for black recipients; 2 and
(4) The use of new immunosuppressant drug therapies is likely to
reduce further the positive correlation between quality of antigen
matching and graft survival.
An ancillary goal of the section is to convey the degree to which these
empirical conclusions are contested and contingent upon rapidly chang-
ing statistical samples. The advent of new drug technologies and new
allocation point systems in particular necessitates reevaluating new co-
horts of transplantation recipients.
1. Racial Differences in Transplant Survival
Early analysis of survival rates for kidney transplantation did not
mention race as a determinant of graft outcome. 3 In 1977, however,
investigators from the U.C.L.A. Kidney Transplant Registry first noted
that cadaveric graft survival at both one and three years was ten per-
cent lower for black transplant recipients than for whites. 4 Although
some single center studies in those early years showed no racial differ-
ences in graft survival,9 5 other single center studies9 and larger mul-
ticenter data97 consistently documented an eight percent to twelve
percent advantage in graft survival for white recipients. 8
92. In fact, the recent article by Takemoto and colleagues implicitly supports this by com-
paring the success of six-antigen matches to all lesser matches as a group. See Takemoto, et al.,
327 New Eng. J. Med. 834 (cited in note 25).
93. See, for example, Advisory Committee to the Renal Transplant Registry, The Thirteenth
Report of the Human Renal Transplant Registry, 9 Transplantation Proc. 9 (1977).
94. G. Opelz, M. K. Mickey and P. I. Terasaki, Influence of Race on Kidney Transplant
Survival, 9 Transplantation Proc. 137 (1977).
95. See, for example, Paul J. Garvin, et al., Recipient Race as a Risk Factor in Renal Trans-
plantation, 118 Arch. Surg. 1441 (1983); Arthur J. Matas, et al., Does Race Affect Renal Trans-
plant Results?: A Single Institution Study, 1 Clinical Transplantation 261 (1987); Vijay K. Mittal,
et al., Influence of Race on Cadaveric Kidney Transplantation, 11 Dialysis & Transplantation 960
(1982).
96. See Bruce 0. Barger, et al., Influence of Race on Renal Allograft Survival in the Pre-
and Postcyclosporine Era, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Clinical Transplants 1987 217 (U.C.L.A. Tissue
Typing Laboratory, 1987); Frank P. Stuart, et al., Race as a Risk Factor in Cadaver Kidney
Transplantation, 114 Arch. Surg. 416 (1979).
97. See, for example, J. Michael Cecka, The Roles of Sex, Race, and ABO Groups, in Paul I.
Terasaki, ed., Clinical Transplants 1986 199 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1986); Galton,
Racial Effect on Kidney Transplantation, in Clinical Kidney Transplants 1985 153 (cited in note
91); Rafael Oriol, Jacques Le Pendu, and Calvin Chun, Influence of the Original Disease, Race,
and Center on the Outcome of Kidney Transplantation, 33 Transplantation 22 (1982).
98. These results can be summarized:
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The introduction of the drug cyclosporine as an immunosuppres-
sant therapy in 1983-1984 dramatically increased the one-year survival
rate of kidney transplants and raised hopes of diminishing racial differ-
ences in graft survival. Again, small single-center reports suggested no
racial difference at one year in survival of first cadaveric transplants
and showed vastly superior overall results using cyclosporine-based pro-
tocols. 9 Multicenter data, however, while confirming improved graft
survival, have continued to show a racial effect of eight to eleven per-
cent. See Table 4.
TABLE 4. ONE YEAR GRAFT SURVIVAL IN PRIMARY CADAVERIC
TRANSPLANTS BY RACE IN CYCLOSPORINE-TREATED PATIENTS
Graft Survival
Study YRS of Study No. Transplants White (N) Black (N)
Cecka 00  83-85 2190 77% (1944) 66% (246)
Kondo 01  84-87 6655 77% (5126) 68% (1529)
Barger1 0 2  83-86 437 76% (256) 60% (181)
Long term graft survival also varies with race: the half-life of kidney
transplants in black recipients has been found to be as much as fifty
percent shorter than for white recipients-four and eight years respec-
ONE YEAR GRAFT SURVIVAL IN PRIMARY CADAVERIC TRANSPLANTS By RACE IN PATIENTS TREATED
WITH AZATHIOPRINE-PREDNISONE
Graft Survival
Study Years of Study No. of Transplants White (N) Black (N)
Opelz 1970-75 4559 47% (3581) 37% (978)
Oriol 1970-79 10,802 48% (7984) 36% (2129)
Krakauer 1977-80 7202 58% (5558) 50% (1624).
Opelz, Mickey, and Terasaki, 9 Transplantation Proc. 137 (cited in note 94); Oriol, Le Pendu, and
Chun, 33 Transplantation 22 (cited in note 97); Krakauer, et al., 308 New Eng. J. Med. 1558 (cited
in note 91).
99. See Matas, et al., 1 Clinical Transplantation 261 (cited in note 95); H. J. Ward, et al.,
Outcome of Renal Transplantation in Blacks, 19 Transplantation Proc. 1546 (1987). A recent
study indicates, however, that cyclosporine may not enhance long-term survival of kidney trans-
plants. The half-life of transplants in the cyclosporine and the precyclosporine eras were not statis-
tically different-7.2 and 6.9 years respectively. Gjertson, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (cited
in note 25).
100. Cecka, The Roles of Sex, Race, and ABO Groups, in Clinical Transplants 1986 199
(cited in note 97).
101. Kazunori Kondo, et al., Racial Effect on Kidney Transplants, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed.,
Clinical Transplants 1987 339 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1987).
102. Barger, et al., 53 Transplantation 770 (cited in note 89). See also G. Opelz, et al., Kid-
ney Graft Survival Rates in Black Cyclosporine-Treated Recipients, 21 Transplantation Proc.
3918 (1989) (finding that the three-year survival rates for black and white cadaveric kidney recipi-
ents were 50% and 70%, respectively).
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tively 10 3 These differences in both one-year graft survival and half-life
are depicted in Figure 1.104
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Several explanations have been proposed for this racial disparity in
graft survival, including racial differences in (1) original kidney disease
and recurrence rate,10 5  (2) the quality of antigen matching,10 6
(3) the quality of the transplanting center,107  (4) patient
103. S. Takemoto and P. I. Terasaki, A Comparison of Kidney Transplant Survival in
White and Black Recipients, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3865 (1989); Joyce Yuge and J. M. Cecka,
The Race Effect, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Clinical Transplants 1989 407 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing
Laboratory, 1989).
104. Reproduced by permission from Paul Terasaki, et al., Long Term Survival of Kidney
Grafts, 21 Transplantation Proc. 615, 616 (1989).
105. It has been suggested that high blood pressure as a cause of kidney failure might also be
associated with poorer transplant outcomes. Oriol, Le Pendu, and Chun, 33 Transplantation 22
(cited in note 97). Under this theory blacks might have lower transplant survival rates because
,they are six times as likely as whites to have hypertension as the cause of ESRD. Subsequent
series have failed to offer support for this original disease hypothesis as a major factor. See Galton,
Racial Effect on Kidney Transplants, in Clinical Kidney Transplants 1985 153 (cited in note 97).
106. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 79-83, blacks are less likely to receive kid-
neys with equally well-matched antigens. A poorer average antigen match might contribute to
poorer survival rates. See Kondo, et al., Racial Effect on Kidney Transplants, in Clinical Trans-
plants 1987 339 (cited in note 101); Opelz, et al., 21 Transplantation Proc. 3918 (cited in note 102).
107. Some authors have argued that black survival rates are lower because black recipients
tend to have their operations performed at "poor" transplant centers. Sondra T. Perdue and Paul
I. Terasaki, Analysis of Interracial Variation in Kidney Transplant and Patient Survival, 34
Transplantation 75, 75 (1982) (saying that "Negro recipients appear to have essentially the same
graft and patient survival rates as Caucasian recipients after analyzing for the center effect"). The
cause of widely divergent results across centers is the subject of ongoing investigation. R. W. Ev-
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noncompliance,108 and (5) immunologic responsiveness. 109 No consensus
exists, however, regarding the validity and relative importance of these
factors.
Even though black patients receive kidneys with poorer antigen
matching than white recipients, 10 the racial disparity in survival rates
persists even among patients receiving kidneys with equally well-
matched antigens. A recent multivariate regression analysis indicates
that after controlling for ten other factors-including the degree of an-
tigen matching-black recipients of white kidneys have a twenty-five
percent greater risk of graft failure than white recipients of white kid-
neys."' With this historical baseline of a significant racial disparity in
ans, D. L. Manninen, and F. Dong, The Center Effect in Kidney Transplantation, 23 Transplan-
tation Proc. 1315 (1991).
As a statistical matter, however, the direction of causality has proven extremely difficult to
determine: do blacks have poorer survival rates because they receive transplants at poor centers, or
do certain centers have poorer survival rates because they perform more transplants on blacks? A
recent report from the U.C.L.A. registry attributes 4.6% of the 11% racial disparity in one year
survival to the center effect. Kondo, et al., Racial Effect on Kidney Transplants, in Clinical
Transplants 1987 339 (cited in note 101).
108. Two recent studies have indicated that black allograft recipients are less likely than
white recipients to comply with prescribed drug therapies. R. H. Didlake, et al., Patient Non-
Compliance: A Major Cause of Late Graft Failure in Cyclosporine-Treated Renal Transplants,
20 Transplantation Proc. 63 (Supp. 3 1988) (saying that blacks, comprising 20.7% of the trans-
plant population, accounted for 70% of noncompliant graft failures); Mary Rovelli, et al., Noncom-
pliance in Organ Transplant Recipients, 21 Transplantation Proc. 833 (1989) (finding a
noncompliance rate of 30% in blacks and 12% in whites). See also Donald E. Butkus, Edward F.
Meydrich, and Seshadri S. Raju, Racial Differences in the Survival of Cadaveric Renal Al-
lografts-Overriding Effects of HLA Matching and Socioeconomic Factors, 327 New Eng. J. Med.
840 (1992). When these data were reanalyzed, however, there appeared to be no racial differences
within socioeconomic strata (blacks were overrepresented in the lower income category). M.
Rovelli, et al., Noncompliance in Renal Transplant Recipients: Evaluation by Socioeconomic
Groups, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3979 (1989). A higher rate of noncompliance among black recipi-
ents may be caused by a host of socioeconomic factors-poverty, inadequate education, and the
like-but might also be an artifact of the center effect, discussed in note 107, if inferior resources
are devoted to their convalescent therapy.
109. Recent studies have indicated that lower kidney survival rates for blacks might be at-
tributable to a tendency for blacks to have a stronger immune response to grafts than whites. R. H.
Kerman, et al., Stronger Immune Responsiveness of Blacks vs. Whites May Account for Renal
Allograft Survival Differences, 23 Transplantation Proc. 380 (1991); R. H. Kerman, et al., Possible
Contribution of Pretransplant Immune Responder Status to Renal Allograft Survival Differences
of Black Versus White Recipients, 21 Transplantation 338 (1991); R. H. Kerman, et al., Influence
of Race on Crossmatch Outcome and Recipient Eligibility for Transplantation, 53 Transplanta-
tion 64 (1992).
110. See notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
111. John M. Weller, et al., Influence of Race of Cadaveric Kidney Donor and Recipient on
Graft Survival: A Multifactorial Analysis, 9 Am. J. Kidney Diseases 191 (1987). See also G. Opelz
and A. Engelmann, Effect of HLA Matching in Cyclosporine-Treated Black Kidney Transplant
Recipients, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3881 (1989); Barger, et al., 53 Transplantation 770 (cited in
note 89).
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graft survival, we now consider the incremental effects of antigen
matching.
2. The Benefits of Six-Antigen Matching
Empirical evidence indicates that recipients of six-antigen-matched
kidneys experience significantly improved graft survival. An analysis of
more than 500 kidneys transplanted since 1987 under the UNOS
mandatory sharing policy of six-antigen-matched kidneys indicates one-
year survival rates of eighty-seven percent-a ten percent improvement
over nonmatched survival.112 These results are particularly striking be-
cause transplants occurred at more than sixty centers, with varying de-
grees of quality, and some of the donor kidneys were preserved for
longer periods of time as required to transport them across the
nation.113
There is more tentative evidence that transplants with zero mis-
matches have enhanced survival. As discussed," 4 antigen typing might
not reveal two different antigens on each of the A, B, and DR loci. A
typing blank can result either because the existing sera fail to detect
existing antigens, or because the tissue is homozygotic, meaning that its
locus expresses two antigens of the same type.1 If a blank results be-
cause the donor is homozygotic, then zero-mismatched transplants
might have the enhanced survival characteristics of six-antigen-
matched transplants. An initial analysis of forty-two zero-mismatched
transplants tentatively found one- and two-year survival rates to be no
different from those for six-antigen-matched recipients.1 6 These data
are particularly relevant to the recent UNOS amendment that extended
112. S. Takemoto, E. Carnahan and P. I. Terasaki, A Report of 504 Six Antigen-Matched
Transplants, 23 Transplantation Proc. 1318 (1991). To control for the possibility of enhanced kid-
ney quality, this U.C.L.A. registry study also reported the survival rates of the other donated (con-
tralateral) kidney if one was harvested. The enhanced rate of survival from six-antigen matching is
reflected in second year statistics as well:
Survival Rate
Type of Transplant 1 Year 2 Year
6 Antigen 87.2 79.8
Contralateral 75.8 69.6
The effects of six-antigen matching were statistically insignificant (P = < .05). See also
Takemoto, et al., 327 New Eng. J. Med. 834 (cited in note 25).
113. Terasaki, Takemoto and Mickey, 3 Clinical Transplantation at 304 (cited in note 58)
(saying that "[a]pparently harvest techniques and storage methods have now been worked out
sdfficiently well to yield uniform high survival rates that are almost independent of harvesting
center").
114. See note 49.
115. A child's locus will be homozygotic if each parent contributed the same antigen to the
locus.
116. Takemoto, Carnahan, and Terasaki, 23 Transplantation Proc. 1318 (cited in note 112).
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national mandatory sharing to this wider class of zero-mismatched
transplants. 117
Six-antigen matching-and possibly zero-antigen mis-
matching-thus significantly enhances kidney transplant survival. Yet
as the foregoing analysis indicated," 8 these well-matched kidneys go al-
most exclusively to white recipients. Fewer than four percent of these
mandatorily shared kidneys now go to black recipients, 1" 9 and at least
one major center has never received a six-antigen-matched kidney for a
black recipient.120 Thus, although the mandatory sharing policy has
been successful for the predominantly white recipients lucky enough to
receive six-antigen-matched kidneys, black candidates have not shared
in its benefits.
3. The Attenuated Benefits of Partial Antigen Matching
When one or more antigens are mismatched, there is a much
weaker correlation between the quality of matching and transplant sur-
vival. In a single center report,121 while whites and blacks had different
survival rates, matching for one or more antigens did not make a statis-
tically significant difference in patient or graft survival at one, two, or
three years for either white or black recipients when compared to trans-
plants with no matched antigens. 2 2 In multivariate analysis of data
from Michigan, 123 the presence of three or four antigen mismatches on
the A and B loci did not increase risk of graft loss. 24 A recent analysis
of national data indicates that the marginal impact on graft survival of
an additional antigen mismatch is greater at the zero end of the scale
compared to six mismatches. 125 Graft survival increases more signifi-
cantly when comparing a change from one to zero mismatches than
when comparing six to five mismatches. 26
A recent article by Hunsicker and Held concludes that recipients of
zero-antigen-mismatched kidneys receive most of the benefit from
117. See text accompanying notes 54-58.
118. See text accompanying notes 87-90.
119. Hunsicker and Held, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28).
120. Barger, et al., 53 Transplantation 770 (cited in note 89).
121. S. M. Greenstein, et al., Does Kidney Distribution Based Upon HLA Matching Dis-
criminate Against Blacks, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3874 (1989).
122. Id.
123. Weller, et al., 9 Am. J. Kidney Diseases 191 (cited in note 111).
124. Id. at 193. The results of this Michigan study are partially contradicted by an Alabama
study indicating that matching at least one antigen on both the A and B loci can enhance one- and
two-year graft survival by 10%. Barger, et al., Influence of Race on Renal Allograft Survival, in
Clinical Transplants 1987 217 (cited in note 96).
125. Hunsicker and Held, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28).
126. Thus, the study concludes that the aggregate impact on graft survival of a change in the
average mismatches depends crucially upon where on the mismatch scale the change occurs. Id.
19931
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matching, though recipients of single-antigen-mismatched kidneys may
also realize some benefit. 27 They found that cadaveric renal transplan-
tation with lesser degrees of matching offered very little gain at all.128
Indeed, USRDS data demonstrate no statistical relationship of HLA
matching to survival of first allografts at five years in the presence of
even one or more mismatches.2 9
The data on the effects of partial matching are, however, not mono-
lithic. Multicenter data from the U.C.L.A. Transplant Registry and the
Collaborative Transplant Study continue to describe marginal improve-
ments in graft survival with improved matching.130 A recent analysis
conducted by the U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory finds that the
half-life of kidney transplants tends to increase with better antigen
matching, but says that this improvement-from 7.2 to 9.4
years-occurs only if there are no mismatches on either the A or the B
locus, 31 again suggesting that the most dramatic benefit occurs only
with extremely well-matched transplants.
A clearer picture emerges, however, when analyzing the effects of
partial matching on graft survival for black transplant recipients: there
is virtually no correlation between partial matching and graft survival
in black recipients. Two studies from the University of Alabama, which
performs a large number of transplants for black recipients, concluded
that partial antigen matching did not improve black patients' chances
of graft survival. 3 2 Three recent reviews from the U.C.L.A. registry
failed to note any relationship between cadaveric allograft survival in
blacks and antigen matching. 133 Although an article from the Collabora-
tive Transplant Study reported a marginal positive effect of antigen
matching, the authors concluded: "[T]he lack of a matching effect in
127. Hunsicker and Held, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28).
128. Id. The authors also conclude: "The most recent UNOS/UCLA data also show a sub-
stantial decrease in the long-term benefits of matching with as few as one mismatched antigen."
Id. at 298.
129. Hunsicker and Held, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28).
130. David W. Gjertson, Short- and Long-Term Effects of HLA Matching, in Paul I. Ter-
asaki, ed., Clinical Transplants 1989 353 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1989); Gerhard
Opelz, In Response to 'The Role of HLA Matching in Renal Transplant Patients with Sequential
Immunosuppression', 3 Clinical Transplantation 233 (1989).
131. Gjertson, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. at 1033-34 (cited in note 25). See also Takemoto,
et al., 327 New Eng. J. Med. 834 (cited in note 25).
132. Barger, Influence of Race on Renal Allograft Survival in the Pre- and Postcyclosporine
Era, in Clinical Transplants 1987 at 229 (cited in note 96) (saying that, for example, one year
allograft survivals for DR matched and nonmatched black recipients were 59% and 62% respec-
tively). See also Gaston, et al., 53 Transplantation 103 (cited in note 83) (finding no beneficial
effect of antigen matching on graft survival for black recipients).
133. Yuge and Cecka, The Race Effect, in Clinical Transplants 1989 407 (cited in note 103);
Kondo, et al., Racial Effect on Kidney Transplants, in Clinical Transplants 1987 339 (cited in
note 101); Takemoto, Carnahan and Terasaki, 23 Transplantation Proc. 1318 (cited in note 112).
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blacks reflects both poorer understanding of HLA antigens in blacks
and disparate distribution between races."'1 3 4
The absence of an antigen matching effect for black recipients of
white kidneys is likely an artifact of the imprecise nature of antigen
typing. The immunologic response of the recipient is actually controlled
at the genetic level-that is, by the particular sequencing of DNA-and
is only crudely captured by the current antigen typing method.3 5 Anti-
gen matching serves as a proxy for the underlying genetic compatibility
that directly controls the recipient's immune response. Antigen match-
ing may be a better proxy for the underlying genetic compatibility when
white donors are giving to white recipients. The reduced value of anti-
gen matching for black recipients of a largely white donor population is
consequently less surprising because the underlying genetic material
does not correlate as well across race.
In sum, the evidence supporting a positive correlation between
graft survival and partial antigen matching is dramatically weaker than
for six-antigen matching. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence
seems to suggest that partial antigen matching does not enhance trans-
plant success for black recipients. The latter result is particularly im-
portant because black recipients, as a practical matter, have access to
less than fully matched kidneys.13 6
4. The Impact of New Immunosuppressant Drug Therapies
The empirical analyses of the preceding sections-concerning both
the racial disparity in graft survival and the impact of antigen matching
on graft survival-were based on data accumulated during the
"cyclosporine era." This potent immunosuppressive agent, introduced
in the United States in 1983, revolutionized transplantation with
marked improvements in outcomes compared to previous therapies.
Further advances in immunosuppression are occurring at a dizzying
rate. These improved therapies are likely to have a significant impact
on both antigen matching and racial differences in graft survival. For
134. Opelz, et al., 21 Transplantation Proc. 3918 (cited in note 102) (finding enhanced one-
year graft survival for zero mismatches on the DR locus on the order of five percent).
135. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
136. The implications of these results have not been lost on the transplant community:
To realize the greatest benefit from scarce cadaver kidneys, it may be appropriate to en-
courage transplants that have a distinctly superior success rate, such as 6-Ag [antigen] match
transplants. However, it is difficult to justify giving a kidney to a patient who has been on the
waiting list for a short time while denying it to another who may have waited for years,
merely because of a supposedly better match, the value of which has not been demonstrated
and continues to be disputed.
S. M. Greenstein, et al., Does Kidney Distribution Based Upon HLA Matching Discriminate
Against Blacks?, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3874, 3875 (1989).
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example, at the University of Alabama, which for twenty years had ex-
perienced eight percent to nineteen percent poorer graft survival in
black recipients, the use of a modified drug regimen known as "quadru-
ple therapy" has completely abrogated racial disparity in graft survival
since its introduction in 1987.137 In this series of 642 patients, there also
was no impact of HLA matching on graft survival in blacks and only
minimal effects of improved matching in whites.
TABLE 5. GRAFT SURVIVAL AT ONE YEAR s' 3
Recipient Race
Black
White
Standard (N=276)
54% (112)
74% (164)
The parity in survival rates induced by quadruple
for periods of at least three years.
Quad (N=366)
76% (180)
73% (186).
therapy was evident
STANDARD THERAPY
100j
80-
60-
40.
U • e • I * I
0 6 12 18 2430 36
Months Posttransplant
137. Gaston, et al., 53 Transplantation 103 (cited in note 83).
138. Id. (reproduced with permission). I
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QUADRUPLE THERAPY
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With quadruple immunosuppression, a potent anti-rejection agent
known as Minnesota anti-lymphoblast globulin (MALG) is added
prophylactically to standard cyclosporine-based therapy.3 9 Improve-
ment in graft survival for black recipients with this regimen has also
been documented in a recent review of data from several centers. 140 The
experience of several transplant centers has shown that with quadruple
therapy, all recipients-white and black-achieve success rates rivalling
those usually associated with six-antigen matches regardless of antigen
matching.' 4 ' Available evidence thus suggests that with quadruple ther-
apy neither race nor quality of antigen matching predicts graft survival.
Of potentially greater significance are new drugs on the horizon,
which appear to offer more potent immunosuppression, fewer rejec-
139. Standard therapy is known as "triple drug" therapy, using cyclosporine along with
azathioprine and prednisone in what is thought to be a beneficial combination. Hence, the addition
of MALG becomes "quadruple therapy." Quadruple therapy is synonymous with "sequential ther-
apy." MALG is itself an antibody, extracted from horses, that is used to attack the lymphocytes of
the recipient that initiate a response to a nonmatching antigen of the transplanted kidney. By
attacking the cells that initiate the recipient's immune response, MALG may enhance graft
survival.
140. Donald E. Butkus, Primary Renal Cadaveric Allograft Survival in Blacks-Is There
Still a Significant Difference?, 5 Transplant Rev. 91 (1991).
141. Ronald M. Ferguson, A Multicenter Experience with Sequential ALG/Cyclosporine
Therapy in Renal Transplantation, 2 Clinical Transplantation 285 (1988).
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tions, and less toxicity.142 These drugs include FK-506, which is ex-
tremely effective in liver transplantation and is currently undergoing
trials in kidney recipients; 14 s RS-61443, a new agent of high efficacy
with few side effects in preliminary clinical trials at the Universities of
Wisconsin and Alabama;14 4 and rapamycin, which is still in animal tri-
als. 1 45 It seems likely that the continued development and use of these
new immunosuppressant therapies has the potential to further enhance
graft survival in patients of all races. 146 In short, the new therapies hold
the promise of reducing the importance of both race and antigen
matching as determinants of transplant outcomes.
III. TRAGIC CHOICES
With these stylized facts as a backdrop, we now discuss the difficult
policy choices concerning the procurement and allocation of cadaveric
kidneys. The choices that society makes concerning the disparate racial
impact of antigen matching in the end are of the same nature that
Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt labeled "tragic."'1 47 The optimal
rules for procuring and allocating cadaveric kidneys depend not only on
social norms, but on judgments about the empirical issues raised above.
Ultimately, the absence of clear empirical results may make the alloca-
tion of burdens of proof the most important normative decision of all.
This Part begins by analyzing two of the "cleanest" normative
objectives of allocation: maximizing transplant survival and minimizing
medical cost. We argue that both objectives ultimately lead to alloca-
142. Like MALG, many of these agents are antibodies designed to attack the recipient's lym-
phocytes and thus suppress the recipient's immune response. MALG is a nonspecific "polyclonal"
antibody that attacks a broad range of lymphocytes. Unlike MALG, however, many of the new
immunosuppressants are "monoclonal": more specifically targeted to suppress only those lympho-
cytes that would reject transplanted tissues. OKT3, for example, is a monoclonal antibody that
targets only "T cells" for attack. Newer monoclonal antibodies may be even more selective, attack-
ing only T cells that are actively participating in the rejection response. Gideon Goldstein,
Monoclonal Antibody Specificity: Orthoclone OKT3 T-Cell Blocker, 46 Nephron 5 (Supp. 1 1987).
See also N. Tolkoff-Rubin, et al., Immunosuppression With Anti-ICAM-1 (CD54) Monoclonal
Antibody in Renal Allograft Recipients, 2 J. Am. Soc. Nephrology 820 (1991).
143. See A. M. Macleod and A. W. Thomson, FK506: An Immunosuppressant for the 1990s?,
337 Lancet 25 (1991); R. Shapiro, et al., Kidney Transplantation Under FK 506 Immunosuppres-
sion, 23 Transplantation Proc. 920 (1991).
144. Hans W. Sollinger, et al., RS-61443: Phase I Clinical Trial and Pilot Rescue Study, 53
Transplantation 428 (1992).
145. J. Wang, et al., Initial Use of Rapamycin Immunosuppression in Nonhuman Primate
Graft Recipients, Am. Soc. of Transplant Surgeons, 17th Annual Scientific Meeting 49 (May 1991).
See also Kozo Tamura, et al., 15-Deoxyspergualin (DSP) 'Rescue Therapy' Against Methyl-
prednisolone (MPSI)-Resistant Rejection of Renal Transplants as Compared with Anti-T Cell
Monoclonal Antibody (OKT3), 2 J. Am. Soc. Nephrololgy 819 (1991).
146. Whether the new therapies will negate the 10% improvement in survival associated with
six-antigen matching remains to be determined.
147. Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic Choices at 19 (cited in note 24).
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tion schema that would be subjectively unpalatable in our society. This
leads us to consider more complicated accommodations between equity
and efficiency. We propose a range of allocation alternatives that fur-
ther these more amorphous goals under both current and future immu-
nosuppressant technologies. Finally, we analyze the political history of
kidney allocation in the United States and situate our proposal within
the current debate.
A. The Limits of Two Simple Objectives
A straightforward objective in allocating the increasingly scarce
supply of cadaveric kidneys would be to maximize transplant survival.
Survival maximization furthers one notion of egalitarianism:
"[T]reating differently patients in whom the kidney would work from
those in whom it would not amounted to treating people equally who
were relevantly equal, and discriminating between those groups which
were relevantly unequal.' 148 This objective would lead to the mandatory
sharing of six-antigen-matched kidneys. As discussed,149 the survival
rates of these kidneys are approximately ten percent better than those
of less well-matched kidneys. In addition, maximizing survival rates
might also require awarding some preference-at least for whites-to
partial antigen matching when the evidence also indicates improved
outcomes.
We argue, however, that maximum survival is normatively an in-
complete objective because it would lead to the nearly complete exclu-
sion of blacks from kidney transplantation. The evidence from multiple
studies is that black kidney recipients have uniformly lower survival
rates than similarly situated whites. 50 Our belief that the wholesale ex-
clusion of blacks would be rejected by society depends on the relatively
small size of racial disparity in graft survival.151 If graft survival in
148. Id. at 24-25.
149. See text accompanying note 112.
150. See text accompanying note 94. While some of this statistical correlation may result
from a tendency for blacks to receive kidneys from inferior transplantation centers, the "center
effect" has not been able to explain all of the racial disparity. See note 107.
151. A pure survival maximization objective would not necessarily exclude all blacks from
transplantation, but more precisely would call for a lexicographic system of allocation in which
blacks received kidneys only if white recipients were unavailable. Empirically, however, the num-
ber of potential white recipients would effectively preclude transplantation to blacks under this
system.
Pure survival maximization might even preclude blacks from receiving the cadaveric kidneys
of black donors given the perverse empirical finding that black recipients of black kidneys do not
have enhanced survival rates. See Opelz, Mickey, and Terasaki, 9 Transplantation Proc. 137 (cited
in note 94); Kondo, et al., Racial Effect on Kidney Transplants, in Clinical Transplants 1987 339
(cited in note 101); Harry J. Ward and Martin A. Koyle, The Beneficial Effect of Blood Transfu-
sion and the DR 1 Gene Dose on Renal Transplant Outcome in Blacks, 51 Transplantation 359
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black recipients approached zero percent in the first year, the racial ba-
sis for exclusion might be tolerable. 5 2 Yet, the historical disparity of
eight percent to eleven percent in first year survival rates does not seem
sufficiently high to warrant complete exclusion of blacks from the recip-
ient pool.153
Indeed, the generic normative question is how large must the dis-
count be? If according to the cyclosporine era statistics white recipients
have a seventy-seven percent first year survival rate, how much lower
must the rate for black recipients be before they are disfavored in the
allocation process? Survival maximization yields the straightforward
answer that any reliable discount is sufficient for racial exclusion, but
this simplicity comes at the sacrifice of other normative values. Our
point here is a small one. The social unacceptability of wholesale exclu-
sion of blacks from the transplantation process is strong evidence that
our objectives must go beyond simple survival maximization.
A similar analysis applies to arguments that society should mini-
mize the costs of transplantation." A recent article, for example, ar-
gues for a mandatory national system of partial antigen matching, in
part because the authors claim that national matching would save the
government $6.5 million a year. 55 Their basic argument is that the ad-
ditional costs of a national matching system-estimated to be $1000 per
transplant-are outweighed by savings that result from higher survival
rates.156 This type of cost savings, however, clearly is not the sole deter-
minant of our allocation system. The authors' own analysis indicates
that the use of cyclosporine increases the cost of transplantation. Even
though kidney failure necessitates a costly operation to remove the
graft and return to dialysis, the cost savings induced by higher survival
rates with cyclosporine are more than offset by the costs of the drug
(1991). Wholesale exclusion of blacks from transplantation is even supported by an analysis of
patient survival because, again perversely, blacks tend to have a slightly lower mortality rate on
dialysis than whites. See Barger, et al., 53 Transplantation 770 (cited in note 89).
152. After all, the exclusion of blood type B recipients from the pool of blood type A cadav-
eric donations is not problematic given the zero success rates for such transplantation.
153. This analysis could of course proceed upon other measures of survival, each of which
itself involves an implicit normative choice. For example, the racial disparity in transplant half-life
may be on the order of 50%. See text accompanying note 103.
154. Cost-benefit analysis often is determined by the initial assumptions of what costs and
what benefits count. See John J. Donohue III and Ian Ayres, Posner's Symphony No. 3, 39 Stan.
L. Rev. 791 (1987).
155. Gjertson, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (cited in note 25).
156. Transplant failure necessitates the removal of the graft, which the authors estimated to
cost approximately $10,000, and the return to dialysis, estimated to cost $17,000 per year. Elevated
survival ratbs can reduce the government's expenditures because the government spends only
$8000 per year on cyclosporine therapy for successful transplants after the first-year of treatment.
Id. at 1035.
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itself. Yet, it is hard to imagine that we would eliminate the use of this
"wonderdrug" that enhances survival rates by ten percent to twenty
percent.
The normatively unacceptable nature of this type of cost calcula-
tion is even more striking, however, when extended to issues of race.
The exclusion of blacks from the pool of cadaveric transplants would
save the government even more money than a mandatory national pro-
gram of partial antigen matching. Extending the analysis of this article,
we estimate that the expected present value of government expendi-
tures for a transplant are $98,300 for a black recipient and $90,700 for a
white recipient.157 Reallocating to whites the approximately 1400 cadav-
eric kidneys that currently go to black recipients would consequently
save the government more than $10.6 million per year. 5 '
Again our normative conclusion is a limited one. Both pure cost
minimization and survival maximization objectives would lead to nor-
matively unacceptable results such as explicit racial exclusions. Conse-
quently, one cannot defend or justify other allocative choices by
analyzing these objectives alone. In short, we believe that our society
holds these objectives to be morally incomplete. Our argument is not
that these objectives are unimportant, but only that our society tempers
them with equitable concerns, among them, that government actions
should not burden traditionally disadvantaged races. 59
Two aspects of the current UNOS point system-the 0 kidney rule
and the presensitization points-provide especially powerful examples
of how the current allocation system rejects a single-minded emphasis
on survival. As analyzed above, 60 the 0 rule prohibits the transplanta-
tion of kidneys from 0 blood type donors into recipients of other blood
types unless there is a six-antigen match.' 6 ' Even though the 0 blood
type organs could be transplanted into recipients with A or B blood
types, the guidelines reflect a concern that without this prohibition the
O blood type recipients would inequitably have to share the pool of 0
kidneys with too many other recipients. The 0 rule is an example of
157. For assumptions underlying this calculation, see note 156. In addition, the authors esti-
mated that the transplantation costs $35,000 and that first year treatment (including cyclosporine)
costs $20,000. Id. To capture the racial difference in survival rates, we have assumed hazard rates
for whites of 20% in the first year and 6% per year thereafter, and for blacks of 28% in the first
year and 11% per year thereafter. See G. Opelz, et al., Kidney Graft Survival Rates in Black
Cyclosporine-Treated Recipients, 21 Transplantation Proc. 3918 (1989).
158. 1400 x (98.3 - 90.7) = 10,640.
159. This is what Calabresi and Bobbitt referred to as "corrected egalitarianism." See text
accompanying note 24. J. Michael Dennis refers to this value as "sociological justice." J. Michael
Dennis, 6 Transplantation Rev. 130 (cited in note 60). See also W. B. Arnason, Directed Donation:
The Relevance of Race, 21 Hastings Center Report 13 (Nov.-Dec. 1991).
160. See text accompanying note 73.
161. UNOS Policy § 3.4 (1992).
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equity trumping efficiency because it potentially favors an 0 blood type
recipient with a zero-antigen match over a B blood type recipient with a
five-antigen match. This interplay between equity and efficiency has,
however, a perverse racial dimension. The 0 rule favors 0 blood type
recipients over the predominantly black B blood type recipients and
thus exacerbates the unequal access of blacks to transplantation.
1 6 2
Society's willingness to privilege equitable concerns over a simple
interest in graft survival is also exemplified by presensitization points.
The UNOS system currently awards points to candidates whose blood
contains antibodies against more than eighty percent of potential ca-
daveric donations. 163 Presensitization lowers a candidate's chance of
successful transplantation because the recipient's immune system has
already produced antibodies to attack a wide array of foreign tissue.'
The limited goal of graft survival would cause presensitized candidates
to receive negative points in an allocation system. However, because
presensitized candidates "can wait three or more years for transplant,
they have attracted a near-universal sympathy for their plight.' 6 5
J. Michael Dennis characterizes the treatment of presensitized can-
didates as consistent with the goal of medical justice: "'Medical justice'
is a principle based on compassion for patients with 'medical bad luck.'
Because of their medical condition, these patients have a less-than-av-
erage chance to receive treatment. Medical justice dictates that they be
given allocative preference. "' 66 This does not account for the major
cause of presensitization: the failure of an initial transplant. When ini-
tial transplantations fail, the recipient's body often produces massive
numbers of antibodies that presensitize the recipient against further
transplantation. The allocative preference for presensitized candidates
thus has the perverse effect of rewarding candidates who often already
had the opportunity for transplantation. In economic terms, the "medi-
cal bad luck" is not completely exogenous.
162. As analyzed above in notes 73-76 and accompanying text, the 0 rule disadvantages
predominantly white A recipients and predominantly black B recipients. A recipients may draw
from a disproportionately large pool of donated A kidneys in comparison with the pool of donated
B kidneys available to B recipients and therefore are not affected as much as B recipients by the
removal of 0 type transplants. A differential equation model of donation and ESRD rates suggests
that the advantage to black 0 candidates is outweighed by the disadvantage to black B candidates.
Given the current donation rates, the 0 rule probably decreases the percentage of kidneys trans-
planted into black Americans. See Appendix.
163. See note 61.
164. See M. Aprile, J. Rochon and C. Cardella, Effect of Peak PRA's on the Outcome of
Cadaver Kidney Transplants, 21 Transplantation Proc. 735 (1989). There is a greater likelihood
that immunosuppressant drugs can prevent an unmatched recipient from producing antibodies.
165. Dennis, 6 Transplantation Rev. at 134 (cited in note 60).
I,66. Id. at 133.
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The "near-universal sympathy for the plight" of presensitized and
blood type 0 recipients, which gave rise to these equitable exceptions to
the UNOS allocation system, also might be seen as an instance of effec-
tive interest group lobbying. Both these equitable exceptions respond to
the preferences of candidates who are represented on the waiting list
long enough to form a powerful political constituency. Indeed, the Na-
tional Organ Transplant Act explicitly mandates that allocative prefer-
ence be given to presensitized patients. 6 7 The strength of the
presensitization lobby is such that UNOS turned down an application
for a variance to deemphasize sensitization at a single transplant center.
The OPO in question argued that because presensitized patients have
worse medical outcomes, giving them priority wastes resources."6 8 Yet
UNOS, in compliance with its federal contract, affirmatively rejected
the survival goal to promote the equitable interests of presensitized
candidates. As in other contexts, one person's equity is another person's
private interest.
B. The Relevance of Race
The above analysis may demonstrate that our allocation systems
are not determined solely by the goals of transplant survival or cost
minimization, but it has not directly addressed why society should re-
spond to allocation strategies that have a disparate impact on blacks.
This section attempts to provide such a rationale. One of the strongest
rationales for disparate impact liability in the law is to prohibit actions
that might be motivated by racial animus.' e9 Such suspicions are, how-
ever, virtually absent in the transplantation context. All participants in
the area believe that the original point system and its subsequent modi-
fications were developed in good faith to accommodate the goals of
graft survival and other equitable concerns.' 70
We believe, however, that race is relevant for two reasons. First,
ignoring the disparate impact of blacks represents selective indiffer-
ence.' The UNOS guidelines privilege equity over efficiency when
presensitized or blood-type 0 patients received smaller numbers of
transplants, but are indifferent to the equitable claim of blacks. If the
roles were reversed and white patients had lower chances of matching
antigens, we believe that the point system might give less weight to
167. NOTA § 372, 98 Stat. at 2344. See also Dennis, 6 Transplantation Rev. at 133; R. Men-
dez, A National Allocation System, 20 Transplantation Proc. 1014 (Supp. 1 1988).
168. Dennis, American Blacks at 11 (cited in note 85).
169. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L. J. 585 (1983).
170. See note 61.
171. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreward: In Defense of the Anti Dis-
crimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1976).
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matching. Even those who believe that the best allocation should sim-
ply try to maximize survival rates, the willingness of the system to re-
spond selectively to other equitable claims might argue for considering
the claims of blacks as well. In a world where the equitable claims of
other discrete groups are heard, UNOS's failure to respond to the equi-
table claims of black patients becomes suspect.
Second, responding to this disparate racial access can be justified
as an attempt to eliminate the effects of past discrimination.172 Kidney
failure is associated with a number of other factors that may be exacer-
bated in black communities because of past discrimination-including
poverty, stress, alcohol use, and poor medical care. To the extent that
past discrimination173 has left blacks disproportionately poor and that
poverty induces higher rates of kidney failure, 174 these lingering effects
of discrimination also support society's corrective concern. At a mini-
mum, we believe it is incumbent on society not to ignore the equitable
claims of blacks in favor of other possibly less pressing equitable claims
such as those of presensitized or blood type 0 recipients.
In making this case for privileging race, difficult issues of framing
need to be addressed. For example, one might persuasively argue that
federal funding of virtually all renal transplants represents tremendous
governmental largess to the disproportionately black ESRD population
and that when considered as a whole the program disproportionately
172. Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal,
86 Colum. L. Rev. 728 (1986).
173. Recent research by Clarence E. Grim suggests that blacks may have higher rates of
hypertension and kidney failure because of the quintessential expression of discrimina-
tion-slavery. "[B]lacks living in the United States today may owe their higher hypertension rate
to a genetic trait that helped their ancestors survive the grueling conditions of slavery. That trait is
an inherited tendency to conserve salt within the body .... " Kathy A. Fackelmann, The African
Gene?, 140 Science News 254 (1991).
Grim's provocative hypothesis is that Africans with a salt-conserving gene or genes were less
likely to die of dehydration during transport across the Atlantic by slavetraders. Id. at 254. The
ability to hold onto salt-and thus water-also helped them to survive the harsh conditions they
encountered in the New World. Seventy percent of African slaves died within the first four years of
their capture. This devastating fatality rate might have radically accelerated the process of genetic
selection. The same genetic ability to retain salt that may have conferred a temporary survival
advantage on slaves may now be responsible for a higher level of hypertension and kidney failure.
It should be stressed that while this causal hypothesis is supported by some indirect evidence,
id., it is quite controversial. For example, even though West Africans consume a high salt diet,
they have much lower rates of high blood pressure among American blacks. Id. at 255. Yet the
possibility that the elevated renal failure among blacks is a vestige of the slave trade makes con-
crete the causal link between past discrimination and the current demand for renal transplanta-
tion. Even if we conclude that the theory has only a 50% chance of being true-or only explains
50% of the elevated black demand-the mere possibility that slavery increased the kidney failure
rate among blacks provides a conceivable rationale for restructuring allocation systems that disfa-
vor blacks.
174. Id. at 254 (saying that "the stress of poverty or racism may evoke a hormonal 'fight or
flight' response that boosts heart rate and blood pressure").
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favors blacks-even though the antigen matching aspect of the allograft
allocation disproportionately excludes blacks.1"5 Moreover, even if the
disparate racial impact of antigen matching is a concern, blacks-and
society-might benefit more from corrective efforts that address other
health issues such as high blood pressure, smoking, or even prenatal
care.
Calabresi and Bobbitt argue that no single perspective can capture
all of society's concerns. They speak of "the motion that is composed of
the succession of decision, rationalization, and violence as quiet replaces
anxiety and is replaced by it when society evades, confronts, and
remakes the tragic choice."1 6 In making tragic choices, societies inevi-
tably oscillate between different perspectives. In this Article we have
framed the issue around the ongoing debate about how to allocate ca-
daveric kidneys and have implicitly left aside the thorny issues of
whether government should continue subsidy of kidney transplantation
and whether attempts to remedy past discrimination are better done by
other compensating programs. To the extent that the proper allocation
of cadaveric kidneys remains a discrete public concern, the medically
unjustified disparate impact on blacks is a relevant concern of
policymakers.
C. Proposal to Revise the UNOS Point System
1. Accommodating Equity and Efficiency177
This tension between equity and efficiency concerns is reflected im-
plicitly in the language of the NOTA, which requires organ procure-
ment organizations to "allocate donated organs equitably among
transplant patients according to established medical criteria.'17 8 We do
not claim that a consensus exists concerning the appropriate balance
between equity and efficiency objectives. Instead, we suggest that there
is a spectrum of allocative systems that represent different accommoda-
tions of these conflicting objectives.
175. This framing argument parallels the issue in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
In that case the Supreme Court considered whether an employment test which disparately ex-
cluded blacks violated Title VII even though the employer had hired proportionate numbers of
protected workers. The Court rejected the employer's "bottom line" defense and held that Title
VII plaintiffs had discretion on how to frame their disparate impact claim.
176. Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic Choices at 19 (cited in note 24).
177. A classic discussion of these concerns can be found in Arthur M. Okun, Equality and
Efficiency, The Big Tradeoff (Brookings Inst., 1975).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3)(E) (1988 and Supp. II 1990). Originally the act mandated that
kidneys be allocated equitably "between patients and centers." But in 1988 Congress amended the
Act deleting the reference to transplant centers, thus further focusing the allocation issues on pa-
tient equity.
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At one extreme is the current system, which places almost exclusive
emphasis on antigen matching. At the other extreme would be alloca-
tion by pure waiting list. Giving cadaveric kidneys to the dialysis pa-
tients who had waited longest would ensure that persons of each race
would receive a share of transplants proportional to that race's repre-
sentation on the waiting list. A pure waiting list achieves this equity,
however, at the cost of reduced graft survival. By giving no weight to
recipients who have even six antigen matches, first-come-first served al-
location systems sacrifice increased probability of graft survival for at
least a portion of the transplanted kidneys.1 9 At least in the current
cyclosporine era of drug therapy, we ultimately reject this type of
queueing allocation for reasons analogous to those that led us to reject
the extreme efficiency-based allocation schemes.18 0 We conjecture that
our society cares about equity, but equitable goals, like efficiency goals,
are themselves incomplete.
Our preferred accommodation of these competing goals of equita-
ble access and graft survival is (1) to give allocative preference to anti-
gen matching in proportion to its effectiveness in enhancing graft
survival, and also (2) to give patients with rare antigens and who are
therefore harder to match a preference in receiving those unmatched
kidneys when enhanced graft survival is not at issue. This modified al-
location system would continue the mandatory sharing of six-antigen-
matched kidneys and might possibly give some preference to recipients
with only one antigen mismatch as this degree of partial matching may
enhance graft survival.1 81 Unlike the current UNOS system, however,
recipients who mismatched two or more antigens of a donated kidney
would receive no points. Our proposed system also would give patients
with relatively rare antigens at least the same number of points that are
given for other equitable concerns such as presensitization. Although
the exact values are open to debate, Table 6 provides a redacted version
showing how our proposal would change the current UNOS point
system.
179. There is an argument that pure waiting lists sacrifice equitable concerns because dissim-
ilar people are treated similarly. Thus, among the class of white recipients, a waiting list would be
inequitable because recipients with lower expected graft survival might be given priority in trans-
plantation. We conjecture, however, that pure waiting lists would not be as immediately objection-
able to society as allocations that include racial exclusions. Other countries, for example, have used
pure waiting lists to allocate kidney transplants in the past. See Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic
Choices (cited in note 24).
180. See Part IMl.A. See also 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1642 (cited in note 6) (saying that first-
come, first-served allocations "are ethically bankrupt: society would be choosing not to choose").
181. See text accompanying note 130.
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TABLE 6. MODIFIED POINT SYSTEM FOR SELECTING KIDNEY TRANSPLANT
RECIPIENTS
(Additions are in brackets; deletions are lined out)
Points
HLA matching
0 - A, B, DR mismatch 19 [Mandatory Sharing]
[1 - A, B, DR mismatch 7]
0 B, DR mismateh
0 A, B mismat h
1 B, DR mismatch -
2 B, DR mismateh
3 B, DR mismateh -
Waiting Time
Patient with longest waiting period 4 [2]
(proportionate points for
shorter periods)
Each year on waiting list .6 [1]
Children
Age 0-5 2
Age 6-10 1
Presensitization 4
[Rare Antigens 4]
Patients whose combination of antigens would give them less than a ten
percent chance of qualifying for one of the antigen matching prefer-
ences could receive "rare antigen" points. Awarding rare antigen points
would be consonant with the equitable exceptions already in place. Just
as the presensitization points promote medical justice by elevating the
chances of those with medical bad luck,1 2 recipients with the poor for-
tune of having rare antigens would receive a preference.1 3 Awarding
points for rare antigens thus would increase the ex ante equality of op-
portunity. 1 4 While the criterion of having less than a ten percent
182. Dennis, 6 Transplantation Rev. at 133 (cited in note 60).
183. The preference for patients with rare antigens is even more defensible than the prefer-
ence for presensitized patients because a patient's antigens are an immutable characteristic while
presensitization often is the result of a previous transplant opportunity that failed.
184. Before being antigen typed (ex ante), each ESRD patient theoretically could have the
same probability of transplantation. Typing would then reveal which recipients had non-rare anti-
gens-and hence an elevated chance of qualifying for antigen matching preference-and which
recipients had rare antigens-and hence an elevated chance of qualifying because of the rare anti-
gen preference.
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chance of matching five or six antigens is an arbitrary cutoff, it is no
more arbitrary than the current criteria for presensitization-PRA
greater than eighty percent-or childhood-less than ten years old.
Most importantly, rare antigen points-combined with a deem-
phasis on partial matching-could substantially reduce the disparate
racial impact of the current point system without resorting to race con-
scious points. Because black ESRD patients only rarely qualify for six-
antigen match transplants,185 disproportionate numbers of rare antigen
points would go to blacks. Awarding points on the basis of rare antigen
type would also avoid problems that might accompany a race conscious
preference. If blacks received race conscious points to remedy this dis-
parate impact and possible past discrimination, the rate of white cadav-
eric donations might decrease. In addition, race conscious points
awarded on the basis of a patient's declaration might induce whites to
misrepresent their race in order to qualify for these additional points.186
At a minimum, the current UNOS point system should be
amended to award more points for time on the waiting list relative to
partial antigen matching. As discussed above, 8 7 the current point sys-
tem uses time on the waiting list largely as a tie-breaker. The current
practice of awarding points for as few as one or two antigen matches
cannot be supported absent reliable evidence that recipients with two
or three matching antigens have higher success rates than patients with
Equalizing ex ante opportunity is not universally reflected in our discrimination law. Imagine,
for example, that an employer needs to hire 100 people. Ninety-five of the jobs can be performed
by any worker, but five jobs require sufficient strength so that hiring only men constitutes a bona
fide occupation qualification (BFOQ) under Title VII. In economic parlance ex ante equal employ-
ment opportunity would mean that an applicant would have an equal opportunity of being hired
regardless of gender. A commitment to ex ante equality of opportunity would therefore require
employers to give women preference in competing for the remaining jobs; 50 of 95 would need to
go to women to counterbalance the five BFOQ jobs for which women could not compete. Title VII
imposes no such requirement upon employers to employ preferences to counterbalance BFOQ
hiring.
We suggest, however, that the government regulations concerning kidney transplantation
should reflect a concern for ex ante racial equality. Employers under Title VII are not required to
consider equity when hiring employees, and individual employers are not required to eliminate the
vestiges of past societal discrimination. In the kidney context the government does mandate other
forms of equitable allocations, and the possible connection between kidney failure and slavery
heightens society's responsibility for disparate racial access to this scarce commodity.
185. See text accompanying notes 87-90.
186. A race-conscious allocation system, however, does have some merits. The current point
system gives black recipients an arbitrary preference for partial antigen matching even though
partial matching has no empirical relation to survival rates in black recipients. See text accompa-
nying notes 132-34. Moreover, giving black ESRD patients a fixed number of points could directly
counterbalance the disparate racial impact of mandatory six antigen sharing and partial antigen
points so that cadaveric kidneys would be allocated to blacks in proportion to black representation
in the ESRD population.
187. See note 64 and accompanying text.
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zero or one matching antigen. The current system, therefore, needlessly
sacrifices equity with minimal increase in graft survival. Eliminating
the current points for two or more mismatches and increasing the
points for time on the waiting list can mitigate both the disparate racial
impact and the caprice of the current allocation rules.188
Moreover, our proposal is consonant with the variances in place at
several OPOs throughout the country. The Regional Organ Bank of Illi-
nois (ROBI) allocates cadaveric kidneys under a UNOS-approved vari-
ance that already employs two of our proposed changes. The ROBI
point system gives more weight to time on the waiting list relative to
antigen matching and gives no points for two or three B, DR mis-
matches. 18 9 Indeed, virtually all of the alternative allocation rules put
less emphasis on antigen matching relative to time on the waiting list. 90
Thus, when individual transplant centers seek to vary UNOS rules they
almost invariably move away from antigen matching toward the kind of
allocation rules that we propose.
2. Defining the Geographic Scope of the Point System
Up to now, we have focused on modifying kidney allocation by
changing the relative weight given to different factors under the UNOS
point system. The choices involved in constructing a scheme for allocat-
ing cadaveric kidneys, however, also include the appropriate geographic
scope of the point system. Defining the geographic scope establishes the
pool in which the point system operates. A kidney harvested in an Ala-
bama hospital, for example, could go to the recipient who had the most
points on that hospital's waiting list, on that OPO's waiting list, or on a
national waiting list. The choice of the appropriate pool size is analyti-
cally distinct from the question of the appropriate bases for awarding
points.
Recently, advocates of increased antigen matching have proposed
extending the geographic scope of the partial antigen matching pool.' 9 '
Instead of the current system, which applies the point system to those
on local waiting lists, these authors would pool recipients nationally and
transport each kidney to the recipient who had accumulated the most
points for that kidney based on HLA matching. A national point system
188. Granting more points for time on the waiting list would enhance equity while retaining
some of the benefits of antigen matching. Due to relatively poor matching, however, black ESRD
patients would be able to overcome the racial impact of antigen matching only by waiting for
longer periods. Thus, enhancing the relative importance of waiting list points would mitigate but
not extinguish the disparate racial impact.
189. See Lazda, 23 Transplantation Proc. 901 (cited in note 84).
190. See Dennis, American Blacks (cited in note 85).
191. Gjertson, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (cited in note 25).
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is consistent with an emphasis on enhanced survival through better an-
tigen matching because the larger the pool of recipients, the greater the
probability of finding a good match. The choice of a national system
might also be consistent with an emphasis on equity. If a pure waiting
list were used to allocate kidneys, it would be inequitable to apply the
points on a local basis because under this normative view the dialysis
patients who had waited the longest should have a prior claim to kid-
neys -harvested in any part of the country. Thus, a national scope for
the point system is supportable on both equity and efficiency rationales.
The strongest arguments in favor of a local scope for point systems
concern issues of procurement.19 The mode of allocating cadaveric kid-
neys may alter the number of kidneys that are harvested. The incen-
tives of the harvesting doctor may be particularly important. 9 ' Beyond
the often arduous task of removing organs at the time of death, which
may often be at night, the harvesting OPO must first gain the consent
of the donor family. Making more than perfunctory efforts to accom-
plish these tasks requires a large amount of altruism. Much of the in-
centive to procure kidneys aggressively derives from the knowledge that
local patients will benefit. Local allocation may increase procurement
rates by enabling centers to transplant patients on their own waiting
list 9 4 and aggressive OPOs to reap rewards for their efforts.
Conversely, mandatory sharing of all kidneys may discourage pro-
curement in an era when the donor shortage is clearly the limiting fac-
tor in renal transplantation. Expanding the scope of the UNOS point
system to the national level would decrease the likelihood of transplant-
ing kidneys that were harvested locally. While there are no direct em-
pirical data on the magnitude of this procurement effect, it is widely
acknowledged in the literature 95 and implicit in the current UNOS
guidelines, which require OPOs that receive a six-antigen-matched kid-
ney from another center to return the next suitable kidney with the
192. A local allocation system provides the added benefits of lower cost and quicker trans-
plantation. National allocation, however, has been estimated to entail an increased expenditure of
only $1000 per transplant. Id. While national allocation causes longer delays between harvesting
and transplantation, better techniques and new drug therapies have reduced the importance of
preservation time as a determinant of graft survival.
193. See Blumstein, 22 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 490 (cited in note 4).
In light of the . . . strong condemnation of commercializing organs and its advocacy that
property rights of donors be eliminated, it is ironic that the ideology of "national resource"
for organs confronts and must respond to the territoriality or property rights perspec-
tive-not of donors or patients, but of transplant centers and their surgical teams.
Id.
194. See Thomas E. Starzl, et Al., A Multifactorial System for Equitable Selection of Ca-
daver Kidney Recipients, 257 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 3073 (1987).
195. See id.
848 [Vol. 46:805
UNEQUAL RACIAL ACCESS
same ABO type. 9" In sum, because of this possible procurement ef-
fect,197 we tentatively propose retention of local geographic allocation,
but suggest that more empirical work is necessary.
D. Adapting Allocation to New Drug Therapies
The previous sections have been concerned primarily with discuss-
ing how we should allocate kidneys in the current cyclosporine era. But
as we advance these tentative proposals, the postcyclosporine era is rap-
idly taking shape as new therapies become available. These new thera-
pies not only may increase survival rates, but also may simplify the
normative dilemmas outlined above. If the new drugs successfully elimi-
nate recipient race and antigen matching as determinants of graft sur-
vival, allocation schemes can begin to treat time on the waiting list as
the determinative factor. 98 Under this scenario, the tradeoff between
equity and efficiency would largely disappear.
At the very least, the current empiricism is sufficient to suggest
that immunosuppressant therapies should be sensitive to racial differ-
ences. There is growing evidence that black patients have heightened
immunologic responsiveness 99 and may require more intense drug ther-
apies. 200 Indeed, quadruple immunosuppression, which has proven to
abrogate racial disparity in graft survival over three years, originated
not because of a special concern for race, but rather to alleviate
cyclosporine toxicity. The improvement in black allograft survival was
noted only as an ancillary benefit. Therefore, with the evidence of im-
munologic differences between races mounting, the medical community
now must define parameters of immune responsiveness that may differ
between races. Falling to account for potential racial differences would
be another form of selective indifference, paralleling the unfortunate
196. UNOS Policy § 3.5.11 (1992) ("Payback for Six Antigen Match Kidneys"). See also id.
§ 3.5.12 ("Payback of Voluntarily Shared Kidneys with Extra-Renal Organs"); id. § 3.5.13 (1992)
("Payback of Kidneys Shared for Highly Sensitized Recipients").
197. In reaching this conclusion, we should note that one of the authors is a nephrologist at
the University of Alabama. Because of the high procurement rates of the Alabama Regional Organ
and Tissue Center, a national point system-whether based on pure antigen matching or a pure
waiting list-would inevitably reduce the number of transplants performed at the center and in-
crease the waiting time for those on the local waiting list. Consequently, readers may want to
probe our analysis because of a possible conflict of interest. For a more detailed discussion of
various interests of participants in the current allocation debate, see note 205 and accompanying
text.
198. It may be that six-antigen-matched transplants would retain significance and therefore
should be included in the revised point system.
199. See, for example, R. H. Kerman, et al., Stronger Immune Responsiveness of Blacks vs.
Whites May Account for Renal Allograft Survival Differences, 23 Transplantation Proc. 380
(1991).
200. See Gaston, et al., 53 Transplantation 103 (cited in note 83).
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practice of extrapolating the results of white or male cohorts in other
areas of science. 1
The more difficult normative question may concern the degree of
empiricism that is required to justify a change in allocation policies. At
a minimum, we argue that such policies should not be static, but should
continue to evolve. The emergence of new drug therapies only under-
scores this conclusion. In the absence of authoritative empiricism, ad-
ministrative agencies should consider whether it is advantageous to wait
for more information. 2 While deemphasizing partial antigen matching
may reduce survivability, retaining or expanding the current point sys-
tem will almost certainly perpetuate or worsen the racial disparity in
transplantation. Weighing these speculative costs against certain equi-
table benefits might militate for changing the allocation rules without
waiting for further confirming data.
The current UNOS point system developed outside of the formal
administrative rulemaking process and does not adequately address the
impact of current immunotherapy. Both administrative and therapeutic
changes militate for a revised allocation system. HHS has decided to
formally develop and submit for comment a formal notice of proposed
rulemaking to replace the mandatory allocation system devised by
UNOS. 0 3 In the postcyclosporine era the heavy preference for partial
matching relative to time on the waiting list is normatively untenable.
Even if our prior understanding justified privileging partial antigen
matching, newer empiricism indicates that those benefits are small and
potentially decreasing, with a decidedly adverse impact on blacks. The
current UNOS allocation system is outmoded and should be revised.
E. A Political History of Antigen Matching and
Immunosuppression
These pressing allocative decisions are not being made in an eso-
teric or ahistorical setting. Indeed, we argue that the history of kidney
transplantation has powerfully framed the normative issues that policy-
makers now confront. The transplantation community is itself sharply
divided between those who would extend antigen matching even further
and those who would deemphasize antigen matching in the face of su-
perior therapeutic regimens. In this section we sketch the history of re-
201. See, for example, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Harvard, 1982).
202. See, for example, International Harvester v. Ruckelhaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
203. Mason Letter (cited in note 29).
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nal transplantation and outline the current positions of the major
players in the policy debate. 04
The first successful kidney transplant in the United States was per-
formed in 1953 by Dr. Joseph Murray at Boston's Peter Bent Brigham
Hospital with a kidney donated by an identical twin of the recipient.205
The early history of transplantation was shaped by the use of living
related donors, particularly twins, whose kidneys could be transplanted
in the absence of immunosuppressant drugs. Until the late 1960s
chronic dialysis treatments were not widely available, and kidney fail-
ure was a fatal disease. In those years surgeons were willing to attempt
transplants without firm evidence of the likelihood of success because
the alternative for the patient was almost certain death. Thus, trans-
plants from a variety of living related donors-including fraternal
twins, siblings, and parents-were attempted. At that time the only im-
munosuppressant drugs were cortisone derivatives, which were highly
toxic and poorly tolerated. In the absence of effective immunosuppres-
sive therapies, research focused on genetic determinants of graft sur-
vival. Initially, it was observed that some transplants from siblings were
quickly rejected while others survived for long periods of time. In the
early 1960s Jean Dausset and others discovered HLA antigens and de-
veloped the techniques of tissue typing. The discovery of the antigen
loci and the ability to identify different antigen types furthered the ge-
netic emphasis in kidney transplantation. Tissue typing for antigens
among potential living donors became the accepted method for choos-
ing donors, and results of tissue typing studies predicted transplant
outcomes with a fair degree of reliability.
This emphasis on genetics and antigen matching, which continues
to this day, is in some ways an historical artifact of the early days of
kidney transplantation. In contrast, liver and heart transplantation de-
veloped a radically different therapeutic ethos. Transplantation from
living related donors obviously is infeasible for hearts and livers. In ad-
dition, short preservation times for these organs when obtained from
cadaveric donors did not allow doctors to use tissue typing results in
the selection of recipients. 206 Thus, transplantation of these organs did
not evolve along the same genetics-oriented route, and thus far tissue
typing plays a very minor role.
204. For a more detailed history of the politics of transplantation, see Dennis, 6 Transplanta-
tion Rev. 130 (cited in note 60).
205. See James B. Nelson, Human Medicine Developments in the Law (Augsburg, 1984); 103
Harv. L. Rev. at 1614 (cited in note 6).
206. Hearts and livers, until quite recently, required transplantation within six to eight hours
of harvest. Kidneys, by comparison, may be preserved for 36 to 48 hours.
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The introduction of cyclosporine in 1984 revolutionized transplan-
tation, markedly improving results in renal transplantation, and for the
first time making heart and liver transplants practical. 207 Since the be-
ginning of the cyclosporine era, however, the kidney transplant commu-
nity has been divided about whether survival of cadaveric grafts is
determined more by antigen matching or by immunosuppressant
therapies.
Dr. Paul Terasaki of the U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, a pio-
neer in the development of tissue typing, has been particularly effective
in championing allocation based on antigen matching.208 As noted ear-
lier, he and his associates have called for expanded emphasis on match-
ing-most recently advocating mandatory national allocation of
cadaveric kidneys on the basis of hierarchical antigen matching in order
to maximize transplant survival rates.209 Others, with supportive data,
have opposed such a system. Philip Held and co-authors, using data
from the United States Renal Data System, concluded that even with a
seven-fold increase in the number of six-antigen matches, there would
be only a two to three percent increase in the overall graft survival of
all transplants.210 These data have been disputed by Terasaki and asso-
ciates, who, using data voluntarily submitted to the U.C.L.A. Trans-
plant Registry, contend that a national allocation program that
included partial antigen matches could increase overall five-year sur-
vival rates by five percent.21" ' Such proponents of mandatory antigen
matching programs usually downplay any relationship between antigen
matching and racial access to transplantation.2 12 They argue that the
point system provides more transplants for patients with longer waits
than would a center-driven system, under which individuals have dis-
cretion to exclude blacks from waiting lists. This in no way supports the
207. See Organ Transplantation: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 177, 179 (1983) (statement of Nancy L. Ascher, transplant
surgeon); Barry D. Kahan, The Impact of Cyclosporine on the Practice of Renal Transplantation,
21 Transplantation Proc. 63 (1989).
208. See Terasaki, Takemoto, and Mickey, 3 Clinical Transplantation 301 (cited in note 58).
209. Gjertson, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (cited in note 25).
210. See Hunsicker and Held, 12 Seminars in Nephrology 293 (cited in note 28).
211. Gjertson, et al., 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1032 (cited in note 25).
212. For example, as one article states
Some contend that HLA matching would discriminate against blacks. . . . [Currently]
[p]atients forced to wait for long periods, presumably because they are difficult to match,
receive an allowance in the form of points allocated for waiting time. When kidneys were
allocated according to a point system rather than a center-driven system in a local two-year
trial, transplantation in patients with longer waiting times and those with high levels of HLA
antibodies were performed more frequently.... Therefore, a change to a national system will
not suddenly decrease the number of black recipients undergoing transplantation; rather, it
may increase it.
Id. at 1035.
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conclusion that a national point system would not decrease the number
of black recipients.21 Clearly, the impact of such policies on the black
ESRD community remains indeterminate.
Unfortunately, while the time may be ripe administratively for a
reconsideration of the kidney allocation program, the division between
the two camps is, if anything, widening. Tissue typers continue to de-
mand broader application of antigen matching and are involved in re-
search to define more precisely the genetic origins of HLA antigens.214
Many clinicians remain committed to retaining local control of har-
vested kidneys and are involved in the development of technologies
that have the potential to minimize the impact of antigen matching.
Neither side appears to be listening to the other.215
IV. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF A DISPARATE IMPACT CHALLENGE
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in
any program or activity that receives federal funds.1 6 In Guardians As-
sociation v. Civil Service Commission,217 the Supreme Court clarified
the availability of relief under Title VI for persons injured by federally
funded programs administered in a way that adversely impacts particu-
lar racial groups. The Court held, in a divided opinion, 21  that although
Title VI is directed at intentional discrimination, suits seeking to re-
cover for racially disparate impacts may be pursued under implement-
ing agency regulations, at least against governmental defendants. 219
Thus, blacks who suffer disproportionately in terms of access to cadav-
eric kidneys under the present UNOS allocation system220 would have
213. Moreover, the authors admit forthrightly: "Whether or not survival of the graft in every
patient improves with hierarchical matching remains in question." Id. at 1035.
214. Aida A. Barbetti, et al., HLA Serologic Epitopes, in Paul I. Terasaki, ed., Clinical
Transplants 1989 477 (U.C.L.A. Tissue Typing Laboratory, 1989).
215. A. R. Hull, Editorial, 5 Nephrology News and Issues 42 (1991).
216. The pertinent statutory language is as follows: "No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
217. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
218. Two justices concluded that Title VI prohibits behavior that has a racially discrimina-
tory effect; three others joined with them to form the majority holding that the implementing
regulations, which explicitly mention discriminatory impact, authorize suits based on racially dis-
parate impacts.
219. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 591. See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985)
(saying that Guardians held that "actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities
could be redressed through agency regulations").
220. Persons in this category, as the intended beneficiaries of the government's ESRD pro-
gram, clearly would have standing to challenge policies with racially discriminatory impacts. In
Guardians the Supreme Court definitively recognized that an implied private cause of action exists
under Title VI and its regulations. 463 U.S. at 607.
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to surmount two legal barriers to obtain relief under the civil rights
laws. First, they must show that the system adversely affects black kid-
ney patients in violation of applicable regulations and without adequate
justification. Second, they must show either that the entity responsible
for the policies that produce this disparate impact is subject to suit
under the civil rights enforcement regime or that the agency responsible
for the funding of the organ sharing program, HHS, has not fulfilled its
duty to enforce Title VI.
A. Disparate Impact of Kidney Allocation and Title VI Relief
After the Guardians decision authorized recovery in disparate im-
pact cases under regulations issued pursuant to Title VI, the lower fed-
eral courts set about the task of deciding what a plaintiff must establish
to recover.2 2' These courts found an obvious model in the Title VII em-
ployment discrimination cases,222 which long had recognized that a
plaintiff may recover by demonstrating that a facially neutral policy ad-
versely affects a protected group. 223 As in the Title VII context, a plain-
tiff alleging violation of Title VI regulations makes a prima facie case
by showing a preponderance of evidence that the challenged policy,
though neutral on its face, has a racially disproportionate effect.2 24 If
the plaintiff successfully makes that showing, the burden shifts to the
defendant to justify its policy.2 25 Even in the face of a legitimate justifi-
221. See, for example, Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
California school's policy that placed students in remedial programs on the basis of IQ test results
violated Title VI regulations because it had the effect of discriminating on the basis of race). The
Larry P. court used the regulations promulgated by the Department of Education implementing
Title VI as the source of the right to recover. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (1992). In programs
receiving federal assistance through the Department of Education, this section explicitly prohibits
use of:
criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to dis-
crimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individu-
als of a particular race, color, or national origin.
Id. This nondiscrimination policy is repeated verbatim in 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1991) as to pro-
grams receiving federal assistance through HHS.
222. See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417
(11th Cir. 1985) (stating that the "elements of a disparate impact claim may be gleaned by refer-
ence to cases decided under Title VII").
223. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that plaintiffs may recover
under Title VII by showing that facially neutral practices disproportionately disadvantage mem-
bers of protected groups).
224. Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417.
225. The defendant must prove "a substantial legitimate justification for its practice." Id.
See also Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982. In two pre-Guardians cases, the Second and Third Circuits
departed from the Title VII disparate impact model as to defendants' burden, holding that de-
fendants need only articulate, rather than prove, a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
policy that has a racially disproportionate impact. See NAACP v. Medical Center, 657 F.2d 1322,
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cation, a plaintiff may prevail by demonstrating the existence of an al-
ternative policy that would be equally effective yet would avoid the
disproportionately adverse impact on the racial minority.2 26
Applying this model to the UNOS kidney allocation guidelines de-
scribed above indicates that a Title VI regulatory violation may exist.
First, HHS has promulgated regulations implementing Title VI that ex-
plicitly forbid recipients of federal funds to use "criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to dis-
crimination because of their race. '227 This language is identical to regu-
lations issued by the Department of Education, which federal courts
have found to give rise to disparate impact claims under Guardians.28
Since HHS's own regulations prohibit policies that produce a racially
disparate impact, black ESRD patients can make a prima facie case by
demonstrating that the UNOS point system, with its emphasis on tissue
typing, results in more cadaveric kidneys being matched with white re-
1333 (3d Cir. 1981); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1980). This model corresponds to
the traditional Title VII disparate treatment model, which then requires plaintiffs to demonstrate
that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. See Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982 n.10; John-
son v. Uncle Ben's Inc., 657 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1981). For a description of the burden of proof
scheme for disparate treatment cases, see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 252-56 (1981). See generally Ivan E. Bodensteiner and Rosalie Berger Levinson, State and
Local Government Civil Rights Liability § 8:25 (Callaghan, 1987).
The courts adhering to the position that the defendant carries the burden of proof on rebuttal
were in sync with the disparate impact cases brought under Title VII prior to 1989. In that year,
however, the Supreme Court modified the Title VII disparate impact proof model in Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Wards Cove held that statistics which simply
compare the racial compositions of skilled and unskilled labor forces in a company do not consti-
tute a prima facie disparate impact case. The Court went on to discuss the defendant's duty when
rebutting a properly supported prima facie case:
In this phase, the employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business justifica-
tion for his employment practice. The burden of persuasion, however, remains with the dispa-
rate-impact plaintiff..... "[T]he ultimate burden of proving that discrimination against a
protected group has been caused by a specific employment practice remains with the plaintiff
at all times." This rule conforms ... to the rule in disparate-treatment cases that the plaintiff
bears the burden of disproving an employer's assertion that the adverse employment action or
practice was based solely on a legitimate neutral consideration.
Id. at 659-60, quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1988). In November
1991 President Bush signed into law a new Civil Rights bill that, among other things, overruled the
Wards Cove decision and restored the defendant's higher burden on rebuttal in Title VII cases.
The impact of these developments on Title VI cases is unclear, although they signal generally that
the Supreme Court's view of civil rights claims is more restrictive than that of Congress. In any
event, because defenders of the UNOS point system can both articulate and substantiate perceived
benefits of antigen-based matching, it will be necessary to move to the next phase and consider
whether our proposal provides an equally effective alternative with less discriminatory impact.
226. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660. See also Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982.
227. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1991).
228. See, for example, Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417; Larry P., 793 F.2d at 981-
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cipients and thus has a substantial adverse effect on them because of
their race.2 2
In the Title VII context, the Supreme Court has noted that statis-
tics can establish that discrimination is the "standard operating proce-
dure-the regular rather than the unusual practice. '230 Thus, statistics
showing that an adverse impact is not explainable by chance are sub-
stantial enough to establish a prima facie case.23' The data we present
here undoubtedly would satisfy the requirement to show a substantial
disproportionate impact on black kidney patients. The statistics indi-
cate that black patients receive cadaveric kidneys at a much lower rate
than whites, a problem especially severe in light of the disproportion-
ately high number of black ESRD patients. 2 ' In the context of employ-
ment discrimination some courts have required that a prima facie case
show that a challenged hiring criterion results in a selection rate for the
protected group that is less than four-fifths that of the group most
often hired.2 3 As we explained above, the UNOS system of privileging
antigen matching in allocating cadaveric kidneys has an effect that is
far more statistically significant. First, the statistics showing the rela-
tive rates of distribution indicate that black dialysis patients have only
a fifty-five percent likelihood of receiving a cadaveric kidney as com-
pared to whites, a number well below the eighty percent benchmark
used in Title VII cases.23 4 Second, the current allocation system has re-
sulted in waiting periods almost twice as long for black recipients. 235
To say that black potential kidney recipients would easily establish
a prima facie case under Title-VI disparate impact regulations, how-
ever, is simply to come to the most difficult issue: whether the perceived
benefits of tissue typing justify this disparate impact on blacks. Defend-
ers of the UNOS point system undoubtedly would counter the statisti-
229. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977).
230. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
231. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17 (1977) (saying that if the observed
selection rate is greater than two or three standard deviations from the expected selection rate,
then a statistically significant disparity is present). See also Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309 n.14.
232. See note 13 and accompanying text.
233. See, for example, Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dep't, 766 F.2d 650, 658-59 n.10 (1st
Cir. 1985); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 356-57 (8th Cir.
1980). This standard was taken from the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1991).
234. Held, et al., 148 Arch. Intern. Med. at 2596 (cited in note 68). Statistics compiled in
other studies are even more striking. See Kjellstrand, 148 Arch. Intern Med. 1305 (cited in note
67). See also note 13 (analyzing national distribution rates among black and white kidney recipi-
ents in 1988 and finding that whites were 78% more likely to receive a kidney that year).
235. As previously noted, the 1990 figures indicate that blacks wait an average of 13.9
months for their first cadaveric kidney transplant as compared to an average wait of 7.6 months
for white kidney patients. Office of Inspector General, Distribution of Organs for Transplantation
at 8 (cited in note 11).
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cal prima facie case by pointing to evidence23 6 that allocating kidneys
by antigen matching produces better results.23 7 As noted above, this ar-
gument in favor of tissue typing may be correct with respect to six-
antigen matches. 8 Improvements in immunosuppression, however,
seem to have eliminated whatever tenuous survival benefits partial anti-
gen matching may have had in the past.23 ' Accordingly, the traditional
justification for antigen matching may be obsolete as to kidneys distrib-
uted with fewer than six antigen matches.240
Even assuming that defenders of the UNOS point system might
justify the statistical disparity by pointing to success with six-antigen
matches and the marginal increase in survival rates for white patients
with partial matching, the Title VI recovery scheme still contemplates
that plaintiffs can win by demonstrating the existence of nondiscrimi-
natory alternatives that effectively and efficiently serve the goals that
the challenged policy was designed to achieve.2 4 1 The allocation scheme
proposed in Part III would do just that. The allocation scheme pro-
motes equity by awarding rare antigen points and by deemphasizing
partial antigen matching, for which there is scant documented benefit,
while preserving the benefits of six-antigen matching. Awarding pa-
236. The Court in Wards Cove described the defendant's rebuttal phase in the Title VII
context as one in which:
the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legiti-
mate employment goals of the employer.... The touchstone of this inquiry is a reasoned
review of the employer's justification for his use of the challenged practice. A mere insubstan-
tial justification in this regard will not suffice, because such a low standard of review would
permit discrimination to be practiced through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employ-
ment practices. At the same time, though, there is no requirement that the challenged prac-
tice be "essential" or "indispensable" to the employer's business for it to pass muster ....
490 U.S. at 659. The new Civil Rights Act requires defendants to "demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074.
237. As we describe in Part III above, "better results" might be measured in a number of
ways, including length of graft survival, length of half-life of transplanted kidneys, or even overall
cost-effectiveness.
238. See Terasaki, Takemoto and Mickey, 3 Clinical Transplantation 301 (cited in note 58).
239. Gaston, 53 Transplantation 103 (cited in note 83).
240. Of course, if ongoing research lends support to the notion that partial antigen matching
increases graft survival rates for whites, an argument might be made that the point system is
justified because overall transplants will enjoy higher success rates. But as we demonstrate above,
"success" of the ESRD transplant program is not measured solely in terms of graft survival; in-
deed, if it were, then whites would be entitled to be first in line for all partially matched kidneys, a
result unpalatable to most members of the transplant community.
241. See, for example, Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417 (saying that the "plaintiff
then may ultimately prevail by profering [sic] an equally effective alternative practice which re-
sults in less racial disproportionality or proof that the legitimate practices are a pretext for dis-
crimination"). See also Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(a), 98 Stat. at 1074 (saying that plaintiff may
demonstrate the existence of an alternative employment practice in accordance with pre-Wards
Cove standards).
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tients with rare antigens enough points to compensate for the six-anti-
gen matching preference also promotes ex ante equal opportunity
without reducing the expected success.
Defenders of the UNOS point system might argue that even this
deemphasis of partial antigen matching could result in an overall, albeit
slight, decrease in graft survival. Yet as discussed above, graft survival
is not the only goal of the ESRD transplant program, even under cur-
rent policies.2 42 Because Congress has mandated that any point system
will involve an accommodation between the competing norms of equity
and efficiency, a court might find that this modified point system serves
the statutory goals as well as, if not better than, the present system.243
B. Enforcement
The drafters of Title VI charged the federal agencies that control
expenditures with enforcing the nondiscrimination policy envisaged by
the statute.244 The statute explicitly authorizes rescission of federal
funding as the primary sanction to induce compliance.245 Private indi-
242. See notes 160-65 and accompanying text. The dual nature of the program goals is evi-
dent even in the text of the statute, which requires that the OPTN develop an allocation system
that is "equitable" in accordance with "established medical criteria." 42 U.S.C. § 274 (1988 and
Supp. II 1990).
243. An alternative allocation scheme might compensate for the disparate racial impact of
matching or the lingering effect of past disparate treatment by awarding blacks race-conscious
points. Such a scheme might itself be vulnerable to statutory or constitutional challenge for dis-
criminating on the basis of race. Since the Supreme Court held in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), that an affirmative action program must be struck down under Title
VI if it violates the Equal Protection Clause, lower courts have upheld voluntary programs against
Equal Protection and Title VI challenges. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th
Cir. 1979). In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Supreme Court estab-
lished that benign race conscious remedial schemes established by Congress will be upheld as long
as "they serve important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 565. Given that Congress directed UNOS
to develop a point system that allocates cadaveric kidneys equitably according to established medi-
cal criteria, use of race-conscious points arguably serves the important, articulated goal of equita-
ble distribution and would survive constitutional scrutiny.
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1988).
245. The relevant statutory language reads:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the
termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to
any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity
for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requiremient, but such termination or refusal
shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to
whom such a finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular pro-
gram, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other
means authorized by law ....
Id. In 1988 Congress overrode a presidential veto and passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), which makes clear that the provisions of Title VI are
enforceable against funded entities as a whole if any part of the entity receives federal assistance.
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viduals who wish to challenge the Title VI compliance of private enti-
ties receiving federal funds thus have two potential targets: the private
entity itself246 and the federal agency responsible for its funding. 247
Black potential kidney recipients who are denied access to kidneys
under the UNOS point system248 could sue HHS, which controls the
funding of the organ transplantation network program run by UNOS. 49
A second option would be to sue UNOS directly, as the recipient of
federal funding.2 50 In response to concerns about the unchecked admin-
istrative power granted UNOS under the OPTN contract, Congress
passed legislation requiring UNOS policies to be developed as federal
regulations in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.25 1 In
response to this mandate, the Health Resources and Services Adminis-
tration ("HRSA"), the federal agency charged with overseeing the
UNOS contract, is now in the process of codifying UNOS policies.252
Because this administrative structure now allows for public comment
246. See Guardians, 463 U.S. 582.
247. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986)
(impliedly recognizing a private right of action against Civil Aeronautics Board regarding its fail-
ure to enforce the Handicapped Act).
248. To sue a federal agency, of course, the plaintiffs must comply with constitutional stand-
ing norms-that is, they must show that they have been injured in fact by the agency nonaction
and that the harm to them would be redressed by the remedy sought in the case. See, for example,
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
249. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Supreme Court confirmed
the existence of private rights of action under the civil rights statutes (there, Title IX). Recent
decisions of lower courts have purported to cut back on the permissible scope of private enforce-
ment actions in suits against federal agencies. In Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906
F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the circuit court for the District of Columbia held that private plaintiffs
could not maintain a Title VI suit against the federal government in which they sought "across-
the-board continuing federal court supervision of the process by which the agencies ensure compli-
ance with the antidiscrimination mandates" with regard to school desegregation efforts. Id. at 748.
The Cavazos court was careful to distinguish that case from "situation-specific suits against the
federal agency based on federal funding of a particular project or district." Id. at 749. A lawsuit
against HHS challenging the UNOS point system under Title VI categories would fall under the
latter category and presumably would be permissible even in the District of Columbia Circuit after
Cavazos. But see Washington Legal Foundation v. Alexander, 778 F. Supp. 67 (D.D.C. 1991) (say-
ing that white students may not sue the Department of Education for failing to implement policies
forbidding race-based scholarships under Title VI).
250. Indeed, UNOS has a statutorily created monopoly on the organ distribution market; it
is the only entity that controls cadaveric kidney distribution, and it uses federal funds to do so.
Some language in the Guardians opinion may prove problematic in pursuing this course, however.
Justice Stevens expressed the view that an action to enforce Title VI regulations would have to be
brought under Section 1983, which of course has a state action requirement. Because UNOS can-
not be characterized as a "state actor," Section 1983 relief would not be available. Justice Stevens's
statement, however, was at best dicta, given that the Guardians defendant was a state actor; more-
over, lower courts have not required that Section 1983 be used as the enforcement vehicle in Title
VI regulatory disparate impact cases. See Larry P., 793 F.2d at 983.
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 274(c) (1988 and Supp. II 1990).
252. Aronoss Conversation (cited in note 30)
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about how kidneys are allocated, aggrieved parties may influence alloca-
tion policies by participating in the administrative process. Given the
nature of ongoing research, it is important that allocation policies be
systematically and routinely reevaluated in light of emerging therapeu-
tic technologies. The Administrative Procedure Act's procedural model
might be the best vehicle for assessing the adequacy of these evolving
systems in achieving the proper accommodation of equity and
efficiency.
V. CONCLUSION
The severe and growing shortage of transplantable kidneys necessi-
tates "tragic" allocative choices regarding the competing social objec-
tives of graft survival, graft procurement, and equity. This Article has
presented a series of stylized facts related to the disparate racial impact
of antigen matching. Because blacks and whites have different distribu-
tions of antigens and because blacks have almost four times the rate of
kidney failure, allocation schemes based on antigen matching make it
more difficult for black patients to qualify for transplantation. Under
the current UNOS point system, blacks receive a disproportionately
small percentage of cadaveric transplants and have to wait almost twice
as long as whites for transplantation. In short, a white dialysis patient
may have a fifty percent higher chance of receiving a transplant in any
given year. Some contend that this problem could be solved merely by
increasing organ donations by blacks. While efforts in this regard are
desirable, it is implausible to believe that black donation rates for both
cadaveric and living-related kidneys can be increased five fold in order
to eliminate the disparate impact of antigen matching rules. Antigen
matching is a "but for" cause of blacks' unequal access to renal
transplantation.
The disparate racial impact of the current antigen matching rules
is not justified by offsetting medical benefits. The benefits of partial
antigen matching are small and declining. Although in the current
cyclosporine era white recipients do have enhanced survival rates of up
to ten percent in the first year for six-antigen-matched kidneys, no per-
suasive evidence exists that partial antigen matching enhances trans-
plant survival-especially for recipients who match fewer than four
HLA antigens. Moreover, the use of new immunosuppressant therapies
further reduces the impact of antigen matching on graft survival. The
current emphasis on partial antigen matching relative to time on the
waiting list sacrifices equitable access to transplantation without any
corresponding medical benefit.
These stylized facts suggest that the current federal system of allo-
cating cadaveric kidneys has become capricious and outmoded. We have
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proposed allocation rules that (1) eliminate points for patients with two
or more mismatched antigens, (2) increase the points for time on the
waiting list, and (3) award points for patients with rare antigens.5 3
While the exact point values might be debated, our proposal gives pref-
erence to antigen matching that demonstrably increases graft survival
while promoting ex ante equal opportunity for transplantation. At a
minimum, new HHS guidelines should award more points for time on
the waiting list relative to partial antigen matching. The extreme pref-
erence for partial antigen matching is not justified by current empiri-
cism. The time has come to reevaluate the system's responsiveness to
evolving medical technologies to promote more equitable access to
transplantation.
253. See notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX: ESTIMATING THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF THE 0 RULE
As described above, 5 4 the UNOS 0 rule mandates that blood type
0 kidneys may be transplanted only into blood type 0 recipients. This
rule favors blood type 0 recipients over blood type A and B recipients.
Because the blood type A population is disproportionately white and
the blood type B population is disproportionately black, it is initially
unclear whether the reallocation of cadaveric kidneys toward blood type
0 patients decreases the total number of kidneys going to black
patients.
Using stylized facts about the different racial distribution of blood
types255 and the disparate racial rates of donation and kidney failure, it
is possible to analyze a differential equation model to predict the likely
effect of the 0 rule on the composition and size of the waiting list. Let
R = a constant rate at which ESRD patients sign on to the waiting list.
Combining the facts that thirty-four percent of the recipient group is
black, forty-nine percent of blacks are blood type 0, and forty-five per-
cent of whites are blood type 0, we can derive the rates at which blood
type 0 patients join the waiting list:
Ro  - rate of new blood type 0 recipients
= [.45(1-.34) + (.49)(.34)]R = .46R.
Similarly, we can derive:
RA = [.40(1-.34) + (.27)(.34)]R = .36R
RB = [.11(1-.34) + (.2 )(.34)]R = .14R
RAB = .04R.
Let N = the constant rate at which kidneys are being donated. Because
eight percent of donors are black, the rates at which specific blood
types are being donated can be calculated in an analogous fashion:
N o = .45 N; NA = - 39N; NB = .12N; and NAB = .04N.
Finally, let G = the rate at which the waiting list is growing [R -
N+G], then a differential equation describing the rate at which the
number of 0-type people on the waiting list changes equals:
dO_dt 
- Ro-N o=.46 R-.45N=(.01+.46G)N
254. See note 73 and accompanying text.
255. See text and Table 2 accompanying note 71.
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which can be solved in terms of an initial position O:
0(t) =00+ (.01+.46G)Nt
Analogous solutions for the other blood types yield:
A(t)=Ao+(-.03+.36G)Nt
B(t) =B o + (.02+.14G)Nt
AB(t)=ABo+ (.04G)Nt
For the special case in which the donation rate matches the ESRD rate
(G=O), these solutions clearly reveal that blacks are disadvantaged by
the 0 rule. Over time, more than forty-four percent of the waiting list
would be black even though only thirty-four percent of ESRD patients
are black. This result is because two-thirds of the waiting list would be
comprised of blood type B patients, who are disproportionately black.
The disproportionately white blood type A recipients are disadvantaged
by the rule, but the donor pool is predominantly white and therefore
provides a rich source for blood type A kidneys.
The model predicts that the 0 rule also has a disparate effect
against blacks when the waiting list is growing through time (G >
0)-but that the disparate effect diminishes as the waiting list growth
rate increases. For the past several years, the waiting list has grown at
an annual rate of about 1200. In Setting G = 1.2, the model predicts
that under the 0 rule thirty-eight percent of the waiting list would be
black even though only thirty-four percent of ESRD patients are black.
1993]

